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Philosophical Values and Contemporary

Theories of Education: II

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Introduction

Very little is being done today in a realist position for constructive education design. Part I of this essay identified five value theorists being discussed in education in the 1980s and 1990s: Rawls, Kohlberg, Rokeach, Burbules, Wildavsky. These authors represent four major value positions (developmental, rational, intuitive, and social). It then described the metaphors use to discuss curriculum theory and drew out four sources of values in a society: politics, social values, economics, and religion.

This led to two questions, which are the focus of the present paper:

1. What would be an adequate matrix by which the theoretical values in these positions can be assessed?
2. How could such a matrix be useful in assessing the major value proponents?

This paper will present such a matrix, develop a procedure for critical examination of the value proponents, and present a philosophic base for educational values which can be embraced by all citizens of the U.S.

1. The Elements of the Matrix

Once the various philosophical positions have been identified there is still a need to find a basis to judge between the positions concerning which one will best serve the needs of a particular educator or system of education. To compare these positions, a matrix must be constructed.

No matrix exists for cross-comparison of the four models, but one is derivable from three strands: analysis of the components of the positions, ideas in Thompson et al. (1990) on justifying social value choices, and ideas in Turner (1991) on choosing between competing theories in sociology. Such a matrix will need to evaluate fairly all the models and make use of warrants (measures of personal/social meaningfulness) which relate to all the models.

Turner's (1991) suggestion is that there are common topics among various value perspectives and that a matrix can be developed using these common elements (Part one). Turner lays the groundwork for a similar comparison in his research on comparative sociological theories, although he does not construct a matrix.

Thompson and his colleagues (1990) make a comparative association of relevant value theories from a relativistic position, but they do not align value positions based on the value terms (they use social data).

In order to identify the types of values in each of the taxonomies a system of relating values is needed. This system cannot be empirical, since this would reduce to Rokeach's empirically based research and conclusions. The system cannot be based on social consensus at local levels, for that is Wildavsky's system and leaves no basis for agreement across systems. The system cannot be based on intuition or reason for this would be something like Rawls' original position and rational principles, which was critiqued in Part I.

There is no hypothetical-speculative systematic approach which may be used, since this would imply either that one of the ethical philosophers or theologians was correct and that there is some basis for rationally affirming that conclusion, or that human reason itself is the test of truth and that there is one rational derivable conclusion to which all humans should eventually come. This last rejection of any authority, even reason, is in keeping with the post-modern trend to refuse to identify any specific person or humanly derived method as ultimately authoritative. The parallel conclusion for people who believe there are absolutes is that these absolutes are not grounded in any state of affairs and therefore are a matter of individual choice.

If a system of related values cannot be based on empiricism, social consensus, intuition, or reason there would not appear to be a basis for construction of the system. This is the conclusion reached by many books on philosophy of education and educational theory.

However, in the present case, the four positions of Part I, representing the four methods of investigation indicated, must stand as themselves the unordered system (perhaps it can be called a taxonomy) of human values. This leads to the methods of investigation being the same as the methods of constructing values based on an application of the methodological approach of each position.

The values which are of interest to all four positions, and which constitute a ground for cross-examination of the four, are the following:

interest in historic continuity,

interest in contemporary reference,

interest in individual freedoms,

interest in promoting the common good.

These are all potentially positive values. However, each one taken individually or as the primary value of a system leads to an imbalance in favor of a course of action which does not meet the sensibilities of the complex needs in the world today. Instead, we can use all four values to form a matrix, by which we can evaluate all value based theories.

At this point the anticipated x factors on a matrix would be the historic orientation of *historic continuity* vs *contemporary reference* direction in the theories, and the y factors would be the philosophical choices of

individual freedom vs common interest. Since all Americans are interested in all four of these values, it seems reasonable that all four would be of interest and that differences of position would be based on the relative weight each value is given in the system. Such a matrix would be shown as follows:

Chart I: Table of Value Elements

historic continuity contemporary reference

individual freedom

common interest

By examining the four positions described in part one the following authors can be assigned to respective placement on the matrix:

Chart II: Value Theorists

historic continuity contemporary reference

individual freedom Kohlberg Rawls, Rokeach

common interest Burbles Wildavsky

2. Pattern of Value Descriptions in the Matrix

How may theories be evaluated relative to one another? Turner's example shows the relative positioning of empirical and theoretical issues in a chart (1991, p. 8), which is reproduced here:

Chart III: Turner's Analysis of Theories

Statements are the way that concepts take specific shape in the language. It is at the level of statements that empirical data influence the way that concepts are formed in language. After showing the role of the various terms of this chart and how the statements take the format of one of the schemes, Turner shows how these theoretical elements are related by level of abstraction (Turner, 1991, p. 21):

Chart IV: Turner's Levels of Theory

High

Level of

Abstraction

Low

Low High

Scope of substantive phenomena

What distinguishes between various elements of schemes (theory statements) is their scope; the range of phenomena covered by the statement (Turner, 1991, p. 21). Useful theories must be abstract to apply to many cases of particulars. But such theories must also be testable in some means in order to be affirmed or rejected. Turner (1991, p. 24) thinks that all three forms of high levels of abstraction are too general to generate good, testable theories. He also thinks that mid-range propositions are possibly too narrow in scope to serve as good theories. Some form of axiomatic propositions or analytic models are the place to build testable theories (1991, pp. 25-26).

This discussion of the appropriate level of abstraction in theory construction is ongoing. Taylor (1993) and Weiler (1996) both raise the question of whether the politico-educational theories of Paulo Freire are presented in so abstract a form as to be not useful in describing any concrete situations. If a theory is presented in an overly abstract way, it is neither predictive nor testable. If a theory is too narrow, that is based on specific empirical results without sufficient generalization, it does not generate a system of understanding which is inclusive and comprehensive.

Turner's solution is to use axiomatic propositions or analytic models. The danger, which he does not discuss, is that he may lose touch with the facticity of the mid-range propositions.

The building blocks of an educational theory must originate, in addition to the theoretical teachings of the Bible, in the empirical level of personal and social investigation (cf. Clinton, 1991B), must be linked together in an explanatory system or causal model, must be generalized in the form of middle-range propositions and must be theoretically linked together to form analytic models. Only when the links of such a scheme (system) are seen does the model retain the connection to factual data and thus preserve realistic integrity.

However, it is possible to go beyond Turner and use even less advanced levels of abstraction. This can be accomplished by relating middle-range propositions to one another in a hypothetical analytic model, and then testing the relationships of the theory to discern if the analytic model is faithful to the propositions; a test of coherence (see discussion in Part I). Some form of analytic model made up of middle range propositions, based on empirical generalizations and causal models is necessary to be sufficiently broad in scope and yet testable in practice.

This formal understanding of statements and the levels of abstraction and scope of phenomena can be applied to the theoretical matrix of relational elements of values in education and will serve as one of the foundations for constructing a matrix in this part, and for evaluating the value models in section four.

3. Pattern of Value Descriptions: Elements of a Matrix Applied

All four of the models of values studied in Part I exhibit relations of theoretical statements (the conclusions drawn) to actual individuals (the persons studied), thus the positions are capable of analysis in the terms Turner (1991) defines for both specificity and generalizability in constructing theories. The following analysis will summarize the discussions of Part I in the terms given by Turner.

In the developmental model, Kohlberg focuses on the developmental process of each individual, which are presented as sharing in similar stages of development, and the ability of the individual to make moral decisions at various levels. In terms of the matrix and Turner, Kohlberg is using individual freedom and historic continuity. The possibility of contemporary life and thought being so different as to be the major factor in moral theory is not even presented by Kohlberg.

The statements reflecting moral decision making in Kohlberg's stages are related to actual states of affairs in the world faced by actual individuals. This corresponds to empirical generalizations in Turner's terms (1991). That these moral decisions would be made by all people raises the issues to middle range propositions. Thus Kohlberg's theory which embraces the middle range propositions is one step higher, namely, an analytic model.

Similarly, in the empirical model of Rokeach, the values identified are the actual values of individuals which they hold as terminal values. Rokeach also focuses on individual decisions. But Rokeach does not extrapolate to say that all humans progress through a values decision process in the same way. In fact, he shows that while individuals in different cultures do hold many of the same values, they rank order the values differently and thus come to different value conclusions. Therefore, Rokeach focuses on individual freedom and contemporary reference.

Rokeach's theory is given in terms of specific words which have meaning to individuals in actual experience. This part of the theory is based on empirical research and generalizations. The collection of the set of values and testing of the set across various audiences may be seen as functioning at the level of analytic models. Rokeach does not really present and defend the larger model, which would have made the transition between empirical generalizations and middle range propositions more clear. It is clear from the empirical testing he does within various cultural groups that the content of the terminal values are at least similar for various cultures.

In the intuitive model Rawls concludes that all individuals, by virtue of being human, would make the same moral decisions regarding any one set of circumstances from the original position, within the veil of ignorance. The influence of the corporate aspect of human nature are masked by the setting of the original position and the assumption is that all individuals would make the same or similar decisions. Rawls does not attempt to apply his theory to past generations or to a distant future. His focus is on the individual in a contemporary field of reference. Thus he focuses on individual freedom and contemporary reference, similar to Rokeach.

Rawls begins with an axiomatic formal scheme and relates it to specific analytic models of rules which govern behavior. He then tests the resultant specific rules of behavior by means of common sense and reason in hypothetical cases, based on the original position. He does not make use of empirical testing or empirical generalizations. But his terms of reference and conceptual outline is within the range of meanings set by Turner (1991).

Burbles' position is articulated in a few articles and limited books. But his position, a variant of Rawls', is representative of many writers (Dewey, 1943; Peters, 1979; Gutmann, 1987; Wynn, 1986, 1988) who believe that

the unique political values of democracy give rise to desirable moral values. The influence of democratic values on the group and the influence of the group on individuals is highlighted. The focus is on actual democratic experience in the modern era, but Burbules grounds the discussion in the early democratic values of ancient Greece (Burbules, 1989). Thus the focus is on the values of common interest to the set of members in a democracy and historic continuity with democratic thinking throughout human history.

This intuitive-democratic model begins with a generalization based on historic experience, that human existence is best served by the principles of democracy (rather than tyranny, relativity, communism or some other analytic or metaphysical scheme). This is almost an analytic model in Turner's terms (1991). The test of this scheme is usually a statement of empirical generalization that in some way human beings are better served in experience by the values of democracy than they are by other values. Some of the writers within the democracy group argue for specific middle range propositions or sets of propositions which form analytic models (sets of coherent principles of democracy), eg. Gutmann, 1990, as tests of the scheme. It is possible to see this position as relating an analytic model to middle range propositions.

Wildavsky (representative of himself, 1987, and Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1991) is concerned about the relation of various groups and sub-cultures within a broader culture. The focus is on the cultural group within a modern setting. The major values in terms of the matrix would be common interests of sub-cultures and contemporary reference.

This model begins with two of Turner's positions. First, it begins with generalizations about common human experience within a sub-cultural group. These are empirical generalizations. But the theorists also assume, rather than argue, that all people are best served by a plurality of cultures and greater variety of cultural values. They even assert that at least four or five positions (depending on how one classifies hermits) are necessary for full development of human potential. This is really an analytic scheme, and is not based on individual or common experience. Thus Wildavsky's form of pluralism is a hybrid of empirical generalizations and an analytic scheme.

In summary, Kohlberg focuses on studies of the range of individual development which are true for all people in all cultures; therefore his focus can be characterized by the categories of study of the individual and links with historic continuity. Rockeach studies individuals within their cultures and their present value reference, not their historical development; thus his focus is on the individual and contemporary reference. Rawls is interested in common values and moral evaluations, but the means by which he does the analysis is through focusing on individuals and what they would do in the original position; thus he can be characterized by individual freedom and contemporary reference. Wildavsky's interest is in common interests within a cultural group and how such groups can be related to each other within the modern scene. His focus can be characterized by common interest and contemporary reference. These results validate the assignment of value theorists, representing the assigned model, to positions in Chart II, both in the types of values and in the pattern of the value descriptions.

4. Application of the Values Matrix to The Four Taxonomies

The goal of this section is to assess each of the identified value models as a possible analytic model for curriculum theory, based on the finding of Part I regarding the four values of the matrix. It would be misleading to say that some of the values of the matrix are strong values of one of the positions and the other values of the matrix are lacking in some of the positions; because the values of the matrix came from the positions in the first place. What can be done is to examine the four models at a deeper level seeking to answer two questions posed in

part one: which position has the most internal consistency; which position has the most balance in formulating a curriculum theory (see page 3 above)? The questions of consistency and balance occur in the context of modern ideas about the aims of education and the needs of the modern world (eg. Thurow, 1992). Before seeking answers to the two questions, it is important to study the literature related to the elements of the matrix.

1) Recent discussions related to the elements of the matrix

In 1988-1989 a number of articles (unconnected to each other) asked the question: is it time for a new revolution in philosophy of education and curriculum theory? Boyer (1988) asked if the current discussions were even asking the proper questions. He focused on the need for value-laden questions. But his discussion, while broad in its questions, did not dig into the values themselves. Waks (1988) asked deeper questions about the philosophical contexts of questions about curriculum theory and proposed three contextual issues: intellectual components of theory, institutional components of theory, and ideological components of theory. The discussion focused on the ideological questions, but Waks did not draw a conclusion. These articles illustrated the need to reframe the theoretical questions of education into more value oriented issues.

Shugart (1989) suggested that in the past there have been battles of the nature of the values of the curriculum and that we can see patterns of revolution. Usually these educational revolutions led to the ideas which 1) were most in keeping with the modern spirit (new, forward looking) being adopted by a verbal minority who either had political, economic or administrative power (eg. the extended years of schooling in response to the depression of the 1930s), or 2) occurred when the weight of the marketplace of ideas swung to one position (eg. Dewey).

Purpel (1989), moving beyond the rhetoric of critical theory and post-modernism, pointed to the moral and spiritual crisis of modern education. This concern is not new. Abraham Lincoln (1859) focused on the foundational values of American labor and government in response to Marx's Communist Manifesto. In 1951 the Educational Policies Commission of the NEA published a book titled *Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public School*, suggesting that in the new schooling after World War II the focus should remain on values because they are the foundation of a free and just society. Purpel believes that schooling has degenerated so far between 1951 and 1989 that nothing short of a revolution in terminology and theory would allow modern education to regain credibility and effectiveness (cf. Martin, 1987). He believes that a new model of values is needed. Tripp (1989) took these points a step further by investigating the idea of a meta-curriculum, that is, a set of underlying values which form a philosophical basis for the ensuing discussion of specific values in the curriculum. Most of Tripp's article is a restatement of commonly understood ideas about philosophy of education. But his focus on the connection between meta-ethics and theoretical components parallels the ideas of Turner (1991) in sociology and many figures in modern ethical theory in the field of philosophy.

Four authors in 1989-1990 pointed to specific issues which are potentially revolutionary. Stewert (1989) discussed first amendment rights, public schooling, and community values. His contribution is in keeping with the discussion of Wildavsky (1987) and Timar and Kirp (1988) about the need for inclusion of broadly defined community values, both at the local level (culturally relevant to local groups and issues) and at a national level (first amendment rights). He does not provide a solution to the problems identified by Wildavsky (1987) or Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990) which were discussed in part one. No article to date has shown how multi-cultural interests and national interests can be balanced in a curriculum.

Butts (1989) specifically examined the state of the civic mission in educational reform literature. His article is in

the ideological group of democratic value theorists (Adler, Bennett, Bloom, Burbules, Dewey, Gardner, Gutmann, Goldberg, Peters, Power, Regier, Tyack, and Wynn). This group focuses on the values of democracy, as they are worked out in practice and is inclusive of the values of the individual person and the national identity. Butts' main contribution is to remind us that the civic issues (issues of interpersonal and national relations) are as important today as ever. This is a reinforcement of Stewert's (1989) argument.

In 1990 Strike (1990) examined the role of parents, the state and educators concluding that parents were the missing agents in the discussions today and that educational reform (based on any theoretical approach) will not be pervasive until parents, and the values of interest to them, are enlisted in the discussion and social power is brought to bear on reform. Bergem (1990) looked at the teacher's role as moral agent, representing local and national interests in the classroom. If the philosophical values are not widely held by parents and communicated by teachers, then any theory is simple a textbook exercise. Change demands widespread cohesion on the direction of the values to be built into the curriculum.

Many of these issues were brought into focus by Brandhorst (1990) who argued that economic and control models of 20th century education have failed, and that we need to define problems in terms of the social values of modern society. This argument reinforces the need for investigations of possible value bases for curriculum reform and for the issues to be redefined in terms of widely held values. Brandhorst concludes that if persons are equal under the law and this value is seen as of primary importance, then justice models (eg. Rawls) are best because the arguments for caring (Noddings, 1996) apply to each person and do not focus attention on the needs for equality so much as on existential, personal realities. Such realities are very important, but cannot form the basis for a national curriculum theory. They are more appropriately included in teacher education as part of the concern for instructional methods and local policy issues.

Thurow, an economist, discussed (1992) the economic issues of the immediate future and the clear rivalry between the United States, Germany, and Japan. He argues that many of the solutions for continuing independence and growing interdependence will find success or failure based on decision made about education and the values of the educational system. His chapter on the current state of education points to the many opportunities and the crucial nature of the decisions about values, but does not discuss current educational reform literature and does not suggest a formula for moving ahead.

Beyer and Liston (1992) continue the post-modernist discussion on the nature of teaching: discourse or moral action. They conclude that teachers ought to be agents of moral change but that the basis for which values to adopt and which agendas to follow have not been agreed upon and that curriculum theory and teacher education are both in difficult times. Fineberg (1993) and Harrison (1994) respond that what is needed is a new emphasis on democratic values, understood in the tradition of Dewey, but focused on modern discussions. They feel that such a balance of historical and contemporary reference will allow the ideological discussions to move forward toward a solution set relevant to U. S. society today (common interests).

Alexander (1992) discussed the balance of science and spirituality as value models for teacher education and curriculum theory. He believes, somewhat like Purpel (1989), that modern education has over-emphasized scientific values; not that the values are wrong but that they have been abstracted from life issues, and that balance in curriculum development and development of the next generation demands an equal stress on the development of the human spirit and more humane values.

Donovan (1995) showed that as Plato moved from his early theory about education and the state in which he develops the theory of virtue, to his later theory of justice (*The Republic*), so must modern education include elements of character development but must be focused on issues of justice and democracy. Sandin (1992) discusses Dewey's theory of virtue in keeping with other modern approaches which see discussions of virtue as about temporary sociological values, not absolutes. The sociological side of this is seen in Tyack and Hansot (1982).

Two major publications came out in 1995: Fine *Habits of Mind* and Neiman *Philosophy of Education*. Fine (1995) argues that we must focus on both continuity with history and solving modern problems. This includes the elements which have been postulated here as historic continuity and contemporary reference. Fine concludes that Dewey and Kohlberg provide the best models for reformulating a set of values for curriculum theory. There is no discussion of Rokeach or Wildavsky.

Fine's point is also emphasized by Suttle (1995) on the need for intolerance. Suttle shows that educators cannot include all values and all cultures in a decision about curriculum and still do a meaningful task of selection of materials and values to be taught. Absolute inclusion would be no more than a survey of possible choices, which would be endless. Teachers make decision about what to include and what to leave out of the classroom every day. Therefore there is a need for a rational choice theory which helps teachers make decisions about what to include.

Neiman (1995) edited a massive work on philosophy of education. From the perspective of focus on values, five chapters stand out. Suttle, just discussed, shows the need for intolerance and therefore the need for a rational choice theory. He does not develop such a theory, but Kohlberg and Rawls are both mentioned as possible models. Marples (in Neiman, 1995) discusses education and well being, that is, the need for development of the whole person. His discussion illustrates the need for the character virtues (eg. Noddings, 1996) and national values (eg. Rokeach). Much of the developmental stages mentioned parallel Maslow and Erickson.

Beck and Kosnik (in Neiman, 1995) argue for a more balanced approach which does not see multi-cultural approaches as competitive so much as complementary and reinforcing. The difference is one of perspective: do we try to include every culture or do we include values which are accessible to all cultures and compatible with all?

Suppes (in Neiman, 1995) revisits the aims of education and concludes that the aims have not changed (character, citizenship, skills) but that modern educational theory is asking different questions about how education is to be conducted and the need for a more humane understanding of personal relationships within the network of social relations. This really asks the character questions in a different way. There has been a growing consensus in Millar (1986), Martin (1987), and Miller (1988).

Goldman (in Neiman, 1995) discusses the need for a social epistemology; a way of knowing based on social relations. The major positions are contrasted as democratic and socialistic, in keeping with the matrix criterion elements in this dissertation of individual freedom and common interests. Development of a social epistemology would clarify the values involved and include a rational choice decision model.

This historical update suggests that the four values of the matrix are well founded, not only in the historic positions discussed but also in the most recent literature. But is the matrix sufficiently inclusive? Specifically,

does the matrix provide adequate focus on the current issues of development of character and citizenship (Snauwaert, 1995; Garrison, 1996; Gutmann, 1996;Kaplan, 1996; Rice, 1996)? These issues are included in most theoretical discussion in recent literature.

Conclusion

Both issues (character and citizenship) relate to the aims of education. In this sense, they are both about outcomes of the educational process. The question can be reformulated as "do the four positions of the matrix allow adequate focus on character and citizenship outcomes?" All four positions include discussion about the outcomes of development of the positions in practice. The developmental model includes the interests of the individual and the interests of the community (state). There is philosophical space for both character (via Krathwold's taxonomy, 1964) and for citizenship (needs of the state discussed at Kohlberg's level three and four).

The empirical model examines both individual values and the cultural and national grouping of the values. Rokeach does not discuss the formation of these values at either level, but such a study could be done within his system of values.

The intuitive model, represented by Rawls has an interesting blend of personal and social values in the discussion of his original position. He does not focus on the formation of the values held by the individuals. But he does discuss the interplay of values related to citizenship and common interests which each person brings to the community.

The intuitive-democratic model of Burbules is very good on the common interests (values) which should be taught in schools today. This includes specific information related to character and citizenship. He also discusses the elements of character formation outside the school setting.

Wildavsky's cultural model discusses the common interests of cultural groups, but does little with the formation of values within the group or with the development of individual character of the members of the group.

2) Evaluation

Each of the four positions has a certain measure of internal consistency, or they would not have become the major positions of value theorists today. Two tests of consistency are possible: rational and systematic. The rational test focuses on pure reason or logic and tests the creditability of each assertion. The systematic test examines the inner relations of the statements as a set, i.e., it focuses on the consistency of the elements forming a unified theory (much like Turner's development along the levels of abstraction).

From a purely rational perspective, the rational-intuitive position of Rawls perhaps has the greater consistency. He formulates the position from an axiomatic perspective. Each of the other positions begins from empirical research (Rokeach) or experience of teachers, students, and cultures (Burbules, Kohlberg, Wildavsky). Within these three positions the empirical model has the greater consistency since Rokeach used careful analytic procedures and accumulated data from many cultural contexts. The intuitive-democratic model and the cultural model represent positions which focus on the corporate human experience, nationally and in local cultures. With these foci there is less specificity of direct observation and proportionally greater generalization. This helps the positions of Burbules and Wildavsky to have greater power for generalization, in Turner's terms, but less

connection to either logic or empirical validation.

The four models can also be examined for balance: the use of all four of the value elements of the matrix in a cohesive system. The intuitive system of Rawls and the generalized system of Burbules have greater systematic extension and a long history of research. Rokeach has greater breadth across the empirical spectrum. Wildavsky perhaps has greater relevance for cultural approaches to education today. Burbules and Kohlberg are closer to the desired position of analytic models related to middle range propositions.

What can be concluded from this brief examination of the four positions in terms of systemic consistency and balance of values? Rawls, Rokeach and Burbules have greater internal consistency and Rawls and Burbules have greater systematic extension. Kohlberg and Burbules have the systematic foundation most in keeping with Turner's systematic model. The intuitive- democratic model seems to be the most advantageous overall, but has no central spokesperson at the present.

5. Conclusion

The matrix presents the four models of values in a way which is useful and relevant to discussions of curriculum values today. Each of the positions "fits" the grid of systematic terms and has potential for rational and empirical testing.

Further, the matrix includes value elements identified by Brandhorst (1990) and Fine (1995) in recent discussions. Brandhorst's rejection of economic and control models lays a foundation for moving to a new theoretical base which does not primarily serve business or government concerns. In this sense it is a constructive response to the deconstructionist and post-modernist concerns. Brandhorst favors a model which includes social issues (common interests) and personal justice issues (personal freedom, with limits in behalf of justice). Fine looks at the other elements of historic continuity and contemporary reference. She looks to the earlier works of Dewey and Kohlberg for a source for future theoretical development.

The developmental model and the cultural model need greater development in order to give more systematic depth to the positions. The intuitive-democratic model needs to be spelled out in a more cohesive and thorough way, but has a good foundation for such development. The Rawls and Rokeach systems both need to be extended; Rawls toward greater middle range propositions and Rokeach toward an analytic model. Perhaps they can be synthesized into a more dynamic model, since they reinforce similar values. The cultural model needs to be expanded in many directions. It needs to clarify the basis for assignment of values. It needs to extend the theoretical values (essentially multi-culturalism) into practical propositions for classroom and teacher relevance. It needs to relate the axiomatic formal scheme to the middle range propositions of the rich cultural diversity of life in the United States today.

In terms of the actual content of values it is possible to see how a more comprehensive set of values could become the basis for research than exists today. The two founding documents of the United States can be used as a historic base around which all Americans can join according to Burbules (1990, 1995) and Fineberg (1993). These documents were written, not to set forth a partisan political position, but to articulate values which may be held as a permanent heritage by all people, given them by their creator, on the basis of a certain view of people and interpersonal activities (Alexander, 1992).

With these values as the base, a full set of values could be developed to be taught to children as the common American heritage (cf. Bennett, 1993). It is important that the values in a general curriculum be grounded in a position which is defensible as common to all people in the United States (McEwan, 1996; Keat, 1992). The argument has been made that an emphasis on democratic values as habits of character (1932B; 1938) provides the fundamental direction for Western civilization and encapsulates the primary values of American democracy (Wynne & Walberg, 1984; Caspary, 1990; Harrison, 1994; Burbules, 1996; Rice, 1996).

The Declaration of Independence says that Americans hold certain truths (values) to be self-evident:

1. that all men are created equal;
2. that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; and
3. that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

It states that the purpose of government is to secure these rights.

The Constitution broadens the purposes of government to include:

1. to form a more perfect union;
2. to establish justice;
3. to insure domestic tranquility;
4. to provide for the common defense;
5. to promote the general welfare; and
6. to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.

Clauses from these two documents specify ten values: equality, right to life, right to liberty (freedom), right to pursue happiness (autonomy of personal choice), social union, justice, domestic tranquility, common defense, social welfare, families.

These ten values can be related to all five of the theorists examined in this paper, including Rokeach's terminal values. Such a relationship would link the historic continuity with the contemporary reference. With these ten values as the base and the terminal values as supplements, a full set of values could be developed to be taught to children as the common American heritage (Brandhorst, 1990). This would also include the four elements of the matrix: historic continuity, contemporary reference, individual freedom and common interests.

In Part I, curriculum decision making was summarized under three metaphors: a conversation, a marketplace, a means of agency. It is now clear that all three of these metaphors are relevant and necessary for constructive and

inclusive change to enable educational theorists to present a series of curriculum value options to the teachers and the public of the United States (Vare, 1986; Egan, 1988; Joseph, 1990). Only through conversation and attempts at change will the ideological foundations of life be clarified and educational theory be able to move forward. The new Values Matrix and the Systems Assessment Model may help this to take place.

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