Developing a Matrix for Assessing Values in Curriculum Theory

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Introduction

Educational theorists agree that values are at the foundation of a philosophy of education, and that curriculum theory and educational policy choices usually follow the philosophical values (Dewey, 1943, 1946; Kneller, 1967A). This dissertation will focus on values and curriculum theory, as well as on the relationship these two elements have on the educational process.

Soltis (1981) argued that the issue of value choices is at the foundation of all curriculum decisions. Years earlier, Dewey (1932a) and Tyler (1949) identified values, such as the nature of humankind, the purpose of humankind on earth, and social interaction as the bases for both educational philosophy and curriculum development. More recently, theorists as diverse as Bennett (1986), Wynne (1986, 1988), and Apple (1979), have noted that values are needed, both as a philosophical foundation for the curriculum, and as leading to moral values to be reinforced in the curriculum. They disagree as to which ones to teach and how to teach them (Beane, 1990).

An operational definition of the relationship between values and curriculum theory is that values influence curriculum theory. This influence is in the form of direct impact on choices concerning the overt curriculum (what is presented as content in the classroom) and sometimes is in the form of impact on the "hidden" curriculum, the beliefs and attitudes presented to the student by teachers and school administrators in the conduct of schooling.

In the process of focusing on values, curriculum theory and the relationship between these elements, this dissertation will examine the major positions concerning values which have dominated the literature in the past twenty years, develop a matrix

for assessing these positions, and make recommendations regarding the influence of these positions on curriculum theory. The only clearly identified position which will not be discussed is that of post-modernism. The justification for this exclusion is that the post-modernists' major contribution has been to critique the philosophy and content of other positions, rather than to present a unified position based on the values of post-modernism.

A major point of the values and curriculum discussion concerns the content of the values and the source of derivation of the values. In his foundational work in curriculum theory, Dewey (1927) argued that (1) the values of the school are a reflection of the values of society and that (2) the social values are relative to the social situation of the country. But he also thought that (3) the "higher" values of democracy, specifically (a) the value of the individual and (b) the value of society serving the individual, are correct and would eventually come to be held on a wide-spread basis by rational people (Caspary, 1990). These three general arguments anticipate, in a broad way, some of the current arguments about the relationship between values and the curriculum which have been developed in specific forms by five value theorists: Rawls, Kohlberg, Burbules, Wildavsky, and Rokeach. Each of their positions will be presented in chapter two. It will be shown that the various positions on the derivation and content of values in curriculum theory are dominated by four main positions: developmental, empirical, intuitive, and social. These positions come from an analysis of the methodologies of the five value theorists. The developmental position is based upon a study of human development and on literature which suggests that humans develop morally in ways similar to the physical development processes. The empirical position studies

descriptively values which are actually held by large groups of people. The intuitive

position recommends values which have been held by thinkers and philosophers over

the centuries, and have stood up under various test of truth. The social position begins

with a theory about the nature of social relations and then examines real social groups

to see if the theory can be affirmed after it is subjected to examination.

It would be helpful from a systematic perspective to have a means to evaluate

these four positions in relation to each other for the purposes of comparison and

contrast. Also, it would be helpful from a curriculum theorist's perspective to see how to

judge between these value positions for the purpose of making choices in constructing

curricula. From both of these perspectives it would be helpful to have a specific matrix

which shows the primary values at issue in each theorist and the systematic positions

these values represent. Since no matrix or basis for comparison of these positions

exists, one will be constructed, based on elements of the four main positions. Each

theorists's position will be compared and contrasted as to their strengths for developing

a systematic position, and for generating a balanced curriculum theory.

Chapter I. Values and The Struggle Over Aims of Education

Any values a position adopts may usually be seen in the statement of

educational aims. These aims (values, directions) are used to then specify multiple

goals or desired outcomes of the educational process. It is not news that there is, and

has been historically, a struggle over the aims of education in the United States. This

struggle is being manifested through political and social pressures concerning which

value choices the public educational system should embrace. For example, according

to Thurow (1992) peace, the environment and economics are values which all people

will have to deal with in years to come and these should be reflected in the aims of education. Other aims of education include character development (Bennett, 1986), development of community (Pechman, 1992) or instruction in the dominant discourse norms blended with opportunities for creativity (Bloom, 1985).

This chapter will study extant manifestation of values in the various aims of education at three levels (philosophical, classroom content, and curriculum content), and will present various modes of justification for choices in aims of education.

A. Philosophical Variation in the Aims of Education

A similar conflict over values takes place in the realm of philosophical direction for education (Neiman, 1995). Positions on issues such as a classical approach vs. a liberal approach to classroom aims, or democratic structures vs. hierarchical structures of authority of the aims of the hidden curriculum, are fights which pit one position against another position. For example, people who favor classical content aims within a democratic structure may find themselves fighting for control with other people who advocate classical aims, but want to see education function within hierarchical structures.

The various positions on different issues are really loose amalgamations of choices within competing values. When the core values are made clear the curriculum positions can shift and coalesce in new affiliations. But such clarity of values and deriving of new, more coherent positions rarely takes place. The classroom, or written curriculum reflects the confusion of the society about the aims/values. The hidden curriculum, the structure of schooling and academic and administrative process by which education is often carried out, manifest these same problems and conflicts.

Since there is at least a weak relationship between philosophical values and the curriculum, two observations may be drawn:

1. some system of values, held and applied more or less consistently

    within an educational system, will affect all areas of curriculum and

    instruction (Burbules, 1989; Tripp, 1989);

2. such decisions also effect teacher education (Eisner, 1985).

Thus, the educational enterprise can be seen as a system implementing philosophical value choices in interaction with cultural and personal elements (Harrison, 1994; Garrison, 1988). It may be concluded that it will be almost impossible to get widely diverse groups to agree on a detailed set of values (approximately 18 values according to Rokeach, 1978). Cann (1997) and Waks, (1988), illustrate some of the many broad variations which continue to exist. However, it is possible to form a consistent theory based on chosen values and it is possible to form one unified system and operate it consistently within an agreed upon set of values as the aims of education. Thus, there is not likely to be one agreed upon system of education in the U. S. to which all people will give allegiance. But, it is possible for all groups to develop systems which reflect their group's values. For the U. S. as a whole to come together there would have to be agreement on at least some of the major values to be included in the aims of education. This aspect of possible agreement will be discussed in chapter five.

B. Variation in The Classroom Content of the Aims of Education

The philosophical values of education also relate to discussions about the aims of education in classroom content. For the sake of discussion this section is divided into general academic aims and deeper philosophical issues.

1. Values and Academic Aims in the Classroom

  The values/aims of education relate to the goals of education (Cremin, 1988). For example, if the desire (aim) is to maximize the content learning of the students, then the goal will be to teach content in the most efficient manner possible. In many books on education today there are many surface aims, which may be reduced to three fundamental ones:

   a. Moral and Character Development (individual and social)

   b. Citizenship Preparation (social)

   c. Job Skills Training (economic)

An examination of how values are included in these areas is important.

a. Moral and Character Development

  Nations and cultures recognize that moral or ethical education is needed for raising young adults who will respect life, property and the rights of other people. Wilson (1993) recognizes that, while necessary, merely teaching about morality is not sufficient. Bennett (1993), Noddings (1984), and Kohlberg (1981) conclude that education needs to call for the development of character, or the willful performance of that which is deemed good by a society. This call to advocacy of moral values was given to an earlier generation by the Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association in their publication, Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools (1951). Thus, character development, or moral education, may include both the teaching of positive morality and the training to achieve moral behavior in practice (Kohn, 1993; Dewey, 1932A, 1946).

  However, since people can live and even prosper while paying at best lip service

to morality, it may seem that strict enforcement of moral codes and calls for strict character action as aims of education are not necessary. Limited freedom to transgress the moral codes of society is tolerable, and some segments of society may lack moral behavior, without this laxity imperiling the survival of the society. However, no society exists which does not have a moral code (Rokeach, 1978). If the educational aim is not only to teach the content of social morality, but also to inculcate it, that is, to form the character of the children, the methods and the motives need to be examined to explain carefully why morality is needed (Kamii, 1991; Kohlberg, 1981).

This short section presents some of the arguments for inclusion of moral and character development in the aims of education and illustrates that some educators include these aims.

b. Citizenship Preparation

Other people in education stress the survival and growth of the state, and therefore place a heavy emphasis on preparation of citizens for playing the roles appropriate to an adult member of the society (Butts, 1988; Gutmann, 1987).

In times of struggle for a nation or a culture, the need to recruit members for the armed services or the need to call members of the society to sacrifice for the common good may also lead to a time of renewed nationalism and renewed commitment to see ones own state or culture gain power. In times of relative peace this theme of preparation for citizenship is still needed so that the next generation can be trained to perpetuate the structures and conditions which have achieved peace, or at least the structures which are believed to have brought about the peace. In a democratic society, such as the United States, the values, structures and means of perpetuating the society

can be taught to the next generation. Some educators call this "transmission of historic values" (Wynne, 1985; Wynne & Walberg, 1986).

c. Job Skills Training

A third possible aim of classroom education is to prepare students to take jobs and to be prepared to make a living upon graduation from high school. This aim does not relate to the lower levels of general education but to secondary education, especially high school. Since 65% of high school graduates do not attend college, their future is in the job market (Thurow, 1992). However, it could be argued that education should not have this aim. Such a choice is usually made by political people in response to pressure from business proponents. Thurow (1992) argues that economic factors exert a major influence on the roles within a nation or culture, as well as upon the dominance of one nation over another. By ascertaining the direction of the economic structures and conditions of a nation, the future elements of economic success are sometimes discernable and the preparation of sufficient producers, retailers, farmers, lawyers, etc. can be started in the schools and, hopefully, give the nation a chance to move up the economic ladder of success in the next twenty years. To maintain stability in the economic status or to protect the position of those who have already achieved economic well-being, it is often the case that social leaders wish to produce workers appropriate to the status quo. Education, in this model, helps to fulfill the wider social aim of economic growth and stability.

d. Conclusion

These three academic aims of classroom education typify the ongoing struggle over the aims of education. At any particular time, the shift of emphasis may go to the

aim for which there is the greatest felt need or the greatest political support.

However, social critics of education and post-modernists have often seen the control of educational aims toward any specific end as conscious manipulation and hence immoral (Parker, 1985; Millar, 1986; Apple, 1979, 1990). Apple would leave the choice of all curriculum elements up to the teacher (1988; 1990).

What is often missing in such analyses is the point that education does not exist in a vacuum. Not all people are equally gifted academically, not all students have the same physical or volitional energy, not all societies have the same needs or freedoms; not all teachers have the same wisdom. Thus, in practice, the adjudication of aims of education seems caught in a socially conflicting scenario, which is settled by law in the individual states. Whether this is seen as good or bad depends on one's political values.

These academic aims relate to philosophical values in the following way. Philosophy, in the form of metaphysics and epistemology, makes critical assumptions about the nature of reality, how people come to know reality, and how people judge what is true about knowledge of reality. From judgements about what is true, people are able to infer values about life and reality which are thought to cohere rationally with the reality judgements.

One of those values is about the impact of education and the aim (s) it will fulfill in a social system. Thus, the relation of philosophical values to philosophy of education can be a very close relationship. The choices of aims of education is one step removed but is also related to philosophical values. The next section will examine this philosophical relationship in detail.

2. Deeper Level Variation in Educational Values

Philosophical values are seen in education in the choices of specific educational philosophies, curriculum choices and educational policy choices. For example, the educational philosophy of classical liberalism values the rationalist tradition through its emphasis on intellectual heritage and the progress of learning. Classical liberalism therefore seeks to develop the intellect of persons so they are able to become as wise as possible and to contribute to knowledge and life from their fully developed minds. These specific embedded values are closely related to the larger values of rationalism.

However, there is no clear, agreed on, definition of curriculum theory. Tanner and Tanner (1980) list over ten proposed definitions of curriculum theory, but never select any one as a standard. One recent book on curriculum theory (Beyer & Apple, 1988) is from the perspective of the reconceptualists (existential to neo-Marxist). While that book is helpful on some aspects of deriving, judging, or evaluating curriculum, it is far from complete, and no proposal is made for a unified approach to curriculum. No other books were found published in the 1980s or 1990s on curriculum theory.

Much more has been done in the literature in the form of journal articles. Specifically, there are more than 40 articles from the 1980s and 1990s which are directly on the topic of curriculum theory (see the bibliography). No more than four of these articles are from any one journal, except *Educational Theory*, and eleven different journals are represented. There seems to be no single journal devoted to curriculum theory. The mix of authors is equally diverse. Content ranges from democratic values to traditional moral values, from Marxist values to Christian values. Many of the authors also write in philosophy of education and in moral education. The 40 articles are by 34

different authors, thus no one seems to be monopolizing the field.

In order to gain a substantial view of current arguments in curriculum theory and the related philosophical values, it is important to examine the literature. Three broad issues in curriculum theory may be derived from the literature: the nature of curriculum theory, the value bases of curriculum theory, and the justification of a curriculum theory. The literature related to these three issues will be described below.

a. The Nature of Curriculum Theory

Conceptually there are at least four different sources of ideas for a curriculum theory. First is the social situation. This includes the historical and cultural issues which have formed and are forming a people or nation (Bloom, 1987; Ornstein, 1989). Second is the contemporary political situation (Apple, 1988). Here is included the constitution of the nation or state, a state or national department of education, and policy makers in legislative bodies. Third is the experience of, and experiments concerning, the learners and the learning process. This is partly captured by the psychology of learning and from subject-matter specialists, but includes all experimental data and teacher-student experience (Shulman, 1987). Fourth is philosophy of education. The focus here is on the values about the nature of humanity, the purpose of life, and personal relations which form the core issues of any particular philosophy (Bell & Schniedewind, 1987).

The results of these four components need to be directed at a particular context, whether it is public education in California or higher education in Kenya. All four of the components will vary depending on which culture and which parts of the educational process one wishes to address. This contextualizing is necessary because curriculum

theory is the means by which the inputs can be mixed and a coherent model for a specific educational plan in an actual situation may be derived (Bell and Snauwaert, 1990). Without specifying the context it is difficult to derive relevant inputs and build a specific curriculum theory (Dressel, 1984).

First (1) the values are chosen, (2) the context is analyzed, and (3) the curriculum theory is derived. Then, (4) the curriculum content, (5) a teaching strategy, (6) the learning environment and activities, (7) the teaching resources, (8) the institutional plans, and (9) evaluation and feedback plans can be developed. This total package of nine elements constitutes, broadly speaking, an educational theory.

The four components of curriculum theory, listed on the previous page, match four of the five elements given by Tyler in his classic outline of a curriculum rationale (1949). Tyler began with objectives, rather than values, and was more behaviorally oriented than some writers today. The major difference between Tyler and present curriculum theorists is that he was talking about these as elements of a specific curriculum plan rather than a general curriculum theory which takes into account philosophical values, cultural issues, and the level of educational design.

Current curriculum theory, in contrast to Tyler, is seeking to do formative curriculum theorizing at a pre-curricular level. Rather than deriving one theory to apply to one educational problem, the interest is in examining the nature of any functional curricular theory and its possible role in educational affairs (Barrow, 1990; Garrison, 1987). There are many explorative investigations from a post-modernist perspective but no positive curriculum theory has been developed on such a philosophical basis. The other theorists fall into the four positions which are discussed in chapter two.

b. Sources of Values and Curriculum Theory

Shubert (1985) identifies four areas of life which contribute foundationally to human values: political, social, economic and religious. The relation between these four areas and values will be discussed briefly below. Some current theorists derive values from one of these areas, some derive values from two of them (Kliebard, 1985). No one uses all four areas to describe the process of value choices. Noel (1993) summarizes the research on intentionality and practical teaching, and suggests that beliefs and values arise from life experience in general.

Political values include the values from the founding government documents (e.g., the Declaration of Independence or the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights), the laws of the federal or state government regarding education, and the values of the political parties in power. Sullivan (1993) thinks that these values can be as varied as the freedom of the political system allows. Apple (1988) makes the point that in the United States not all ideas are given equal opportunity for discussion or equal treatment in evaluation.   In general, however, it is fair to say that the U. S. has a pluralistic system which allows great competition for the minds of policy makers.

Social values include the social organizational values of a culture at the level of nation, state, local city, local culture, and family (Apple, 1990). The social organization can be varied and the values which are deemed important will change as the level of society or individual cultural elements are included. For example, at any social level the authority structure can be democratic or hierarchical. Wildavsky (1987) discusses four elements as necessary to any well formed social system. These will be presented in more detail in chapter two.

Economic values tend to run across wider scopes than do social values, since all U. S. cultures are forced to accommodate to a capitalistic orientation. The U. S. functions within two economic philosophies: free capitalistic growth and government control through bureaucracy. The tensions between these two philosophies give the U. S. the unique balance of capitalism, unionization and government involvement which exists today.

Religious values continue to permeate all nations, including the U.S. In a 1990 Gallup poll (in 1997 still the most recent on this question) it was found that 80% of U.S. citizens claim to be Christians, in one sense or another. Also, 85% claim to believe in a personal God, and 70% think Jesus Christ is God. In other countries religion also plays an important role in deriving values for education. In Malaysia the educational directions are set by the Muslim government, even though only 50% of the people in the country are Muslims. In Russia, where a political philosophy had dominated educational theory for 70 years, some education officials are moving toward religious values to form a common human value base for curriculum theory (Tulyaeva, 1991). They are still looking for a government or political document to define those values; specifically, now they are looking at the U. N. Declaration on Human Rights, which guarantees freedom of religion.

These four value bases, just described, differ widely in the issues they address and their specification of values (Craig, 1990). But there are common themes which are addressed by all four bases. Purpel (1989) describes the most common themes as: the nature of humanity, the purpose of life, and the organization of personal relationships (see also Burbles, 1989; MacIntyre, 1990). Clearly, many diverse

claimants might offer to define the content of values for these themes. In order to begin

to judge between value choices (meta-ethical decision making) it is necessary to

examine how values and theories are justified or warranted.

c. The Justification of a Curriculum Theory

      The usual way of thinking about the mode of justification of a theory suggests

that there are three fundamental tests or warrants of a curriculum theory. They are the

same as the philosophical tests for any theory. In the field of philosophy these would be

known as epistemological justification. These will be useful in the present context in

assessing the four educational taxonomies.

      First is the test of coherence. Here are included both the logical test of "does the

theory contradict itself?" and the more general test "does the theory seem to make

sense?" The first is a logical test and the second is a test of broad personal under-

standing (Giroux, 1988).

      Second is the test of correspondence. This test checks the relevance of the

theory to corporate life and to the educational system, verifying whether the theory

stated can be applied and obtains the intended results for a specific group. At the

theoretical level this test is rejected by some humanists and many pragmatists (Beyer,

1986) on the same grounds by which they reject naturalism or realism, but it is retained

by other writers Derr (1981).

      Third is the test of personal relevance (Polyani, 1958). It asks the question, "Will

this theory work in my context?" This could be subsumed under the second test except

that even within a culture or social group, what will work for one teacher or school

administrator may not work in a different situation or for a different person (Atkins,

1988). This is a legitimate existential, or to use Polyani's (1958) word, "personal," test (Goodson, 1990).

The application of these three tests of a theory should revise the list of potentially applicable theories to just a few for most educators.

A variation on the third way of justifying a theory is by using a metaphor to describe the values which meets a test of basic rationality and seems to `fit' the way reality is for people. Three metaphors dominate the field of curriculum theory more than any one philosophical theory (Dickmeyer, 1989; Gage, 1989; Morrison, 1989). These three metaphors are not paradigms in that they are not mutually exclusive, they are not hidden, and they do not dominate all thought for a person or for an educational system (Kuhn, 1970). While they could, under certain circumstances, form a hegemony (Apple, 1979), in the U.S. at present no one of them does so.

The first metaphor is that of a conversation. Some of the theorists (e.g., Giroux, 1987A) have rejected the concept of any absolutes to govern life and education and instead choose the pragmatists' metaphor of engaging in a conversation (Rorty, 1982). In this metaphor the theorist is one among many members of a community of scholars who study the area of educational curriculum and together, through dialog, come to general agreement as to what curricular model to follow. This paradigm tends to rein-force the expert in the field as the decision maker. This coincides with a bureaucratic, top-down style of educational decision making.

The second metaphor is that of a marketplace. Here the various theorists are seen as collaborators and competitors at different times, with the assumption that through this process some best curricular theory eventually will be found (Tanner &

Tanner, 1980). This theory will always be open to development and change to meet the ever changing needs of the educational market. Thus, truth in educational choice is relative to the needs of the people and the market will be dramatically involved through their expression of changing needs and changing choices of education (Wildavsky, 1987). Theorists design and teachers teach what the market wants to buy. Of course, the theorists can go to the market with suggestions and sell the product.

The third metaphor is that of an agent. Here the focus is on the teacher and the teacher's role in actually using some particular curriculum (Scholes, 1991; Wynne, 1988). The experts are at the service of the parents and teachers to help design the best curricular model possible to meet the felt needs. Collaboration and conversation take place through people, and the system is responsive to the needs of the market through the actions of people. The focus of a system is on the teacher, the primary contact agent. These metaphors cover the dominant phases of the curriculum theory bases in the literature today.

The chief value of the metaphorical approach is that it moves the focus from the content of the value system under discussion to the process of the discussion itself. However, in the process of discussion at some point it seems necessary to evaluate the various values and value systems in the cultures and in the national history and to make more objective judgments than metaphorical descriptions will normally allow. Rokeach (1973) and Rawls (1971) use rational means to evaluate value choices. Wildavsky (1987) uses relativistic social standards to evaluate value choices. Kohlberg (1981) uses developmental processes which result in sixth level uniform human values. These means of justification of value choices need to be given full review. This will take place

in chapter two and chapter four.

What then are the competing values and systems of values which impact the philosophies of education and the curriculum designs in education today?

d. The Various Taxonomies of Values

One way of grouping information is into a logical structure, which does not take into account time or other possible influencing factors. Such a logical organization of content is called a taxonomy. It is possible to take the content of a field, such as value theory, and create a model or series of models of the major approaches based on their philosophical content and methodological approaches. In this section I will look briefly at a few possible taxonomies of values. Taxonomies of values are important for understanding the larger (philosophical) issues of values choice in educational systems. This will help set the approach to the four positions (five authors) with which chapter two will be concerned.

In the U.S., most philosophical value theorists may be grouped into four models which have developed over the past twenty years: the socio/cultural model from Wildavsky (1987); the moral development model based on Kohlberg (1981); a trans-cultural/ social model using empirical techniques (Rokeach, 1979, 1973); and a philosophic/historic model (Burbles, 1990; Butts, 1988; Rawls, 1971). These four schools can be organized around their teachings as taxonomies of values.

However, to make decisions about these various taxonomies a means for judging between them, including the elements which make up warrants in educational value theory, needs to be used. No matrix or other instrument exists for cross-comparison of the models, but such a matrix is derivable from analysis of the components of the four

positions, and from ideas in Thompson et al. (1990) on justifying social value choices, and in a model developed by Turner (1991) on choosing between competing theories in sociology. Such a matrix will need to evaluate fairly all the models and make use of warrants which relate to all the models. This matrix will be developed in chapter three and an evaluation of the positions using the matrix will be in chapter four.

1. Problems in the Taxonomies

One major problem for any taxonomy is how to ground the values which will direct the philosophy of education and the curriculum theory. Many philosophers have tried to base values on a rational metaphysical theory (Rawls, 1971; Johnson, 1980). Other writers have used intuition (Polanyi, 1958), experience/empiricism, and personal relevance (James, 1886) or pragmatism (Moore, 1936).

In a similar way theologians and religious leaders have attempted to ground values in a religious world view (Henry, 1986). The study of such warranted or grounded values is called axiology.

Another problem is which values to include in a taxonomy of values. The American Society for Curriculum Development Board listed six values of choice in their Panel on Moral Education (1988). But these choices, however good they may be, were derived by the popular choice of the members of the panel, not by empirical or rational means or even broadly-based vote.

Kohlberg (1981) tried to ground values in the natural maturational development of the child. He argued that there are six stages of moral development which all people experience, unless they become blocked, and that these stages lead people to specific values.   Purpel (1976; 1989) has argued that such a foundation in moral education is

essential to the future of education.

Wildavsky (1987) and Thompson et al. (1990) have tied values choices to culture by analyzing elements in society. They postulate five basic cultural tendencies, which result in five sets of values.   When this approach is extended to cultural relativity, as in many postmodernist theories (Beyer and Liston, 1992), it often loses sight of the need for unity and positive values.

Milton Rokeach, a sociologist, has taken a different approach (1973). He has shown empirically that the same set of eighteen values can well characterize the deep values of the people in many diverse cultures. The differences between people and cultures is in how they rank order the values, thus changing the priority of the value structure. He carefully differentiates between values (deep beliefs about life), beliefs (surface beliefs about choices in life), and opinions (personal preferences). His sociological analysis suggests that identical value labels and similar actual values characterize all cultures.

2. Transmission of Values

Whichever foundation or taxonomy is chosen, the present U.S. educational systems, both public and private, are capable of transmitting values. The formal place where these values are discussed is in the Social Studies segment of the curriculum. These values, and others, are also taught as school rules from K-3rd grade, given at a deeper level as justification for the rules in 4-6th grade, and are sometimes discussed openly as values in 7-12th grade. These values are fully exhibited in all aspects of the curriculum and in the "hidden curriculum" (Power and Kohlberg, 1986).

These values can also give direction to school roles in student-teacher relations,

student participation in governance of the school, student-teacher-parent-district relations, parent involvement in district review committees, rules guiding student participation and behavior on school campuses, district-state-federal policies and issues, and district-teacher negotiations (the hidden curriculum effects teachers as well as students). All of these functional relationships need to reflect a commitment to local controls, personalization, involvement, partnership, innovation, educational excellence, and student centered curriculum.

3. Combining the metaphors with the nature of values and the value bases, there are four sources of values in a society: politics, social relations, economics, religion. These sources come together into some unique blend of values for each culture or nation (Rokeach, 1973). In a sociological description one can discern the major values which form the `value set' (Krathwold, 1964) of the people of the U. S. or any other national or cultural group.

4. Resulting Values in the United States

The combination of sociological descriptions (Rokeach, 1973; Wildavsky, 1987) and analysis of founding historical documents (Butts, 1988 ; Burbules, 1990) generates the following priority list of values which characterize the United States:

a. Freedom: corporate, economic, personal, religious

b. Nuclear family as the foundation of society

c. Value of the individual, within the group; therefore, caring is a central value

     and equality of opportunity between individuals (not equity of outcomes)

d. Personal and social justice

Each value is maximal, modified only by the preceding values in the list. All four values

can be defended as particularly important to the United States, at all levels of social interaction (Rokeach, 1978).

Historically, these value sets have worked out in three fundamental value positions, with seven or eight discernable philosophies of education. The three base positions are:

a. materialism

b. humanism

c. theism

These are combined or split into the educational philosophies of idealism, realism, pragmatism, behaviorism, existentialism, and general social reconstruction along various lines (communism, socialism, Christian, etc.)(Kneller, 1967B; Bernstein, 1985). Thus, the taxonomies are the result of differing philosophical perspectives and differing cultural values.

3. Constructing A Matrix for Assessing Value Taxonomies

Once the taxonomies have been identified there is still a need to find a basis to judge between the taxonomies concerning which one will best serve the needs of a particular educator or system of education. To compare these taxonomies a matrix must be constructed. Rather than use a single speculatively derived matrix, one can be constructed from the common elements of the taxonomies.

Turner's (1991) suggestion is that there are common topics among various value perspectives in sociology and that a matrix can be developed using these common elements. He lays the groundwork for such a theory but does not develop one.

The topics in education which are of interest to all four taxonomies and which

constitute a ground for cross-examination of the four are the following:

interest in historic continuity,

interest in contemporary application,

interest in individual freedoms, and

interest in promoting the common good.

At this point the anticipated x factors on a matrix chart would be *historic* and

contemporary orientation of the theories, and the y factors would be the philosophical

choices of *individual freedom* vs *common interest*.

	historic	contemporary
individual freedom		
common interest		

In applying the value matrix to the taxonomies (systems of values), four goals will

be pursued: 1) identify the types of values in each of the taxonomies; 2) relate these

values to the types of values currently being discussed in the literature, 3) discern a

pattern that makes sense of the situation within each of the taxonomies; and 4) evaluate

critically the arguments regarding values and value bases being used by the educators

under scrutiny.

Chapter II. Competing Taxonomies of Values

The literature discussion above has identified four positions as fundamental in

discussions about curricular values and these positions will now be discussed in detail.

The goal of this chapter is to see how these values positions relate to education and to

understand the major features of each position. The theoretical position and arguments of each author will be presented. Occasionally the discussion of literature will focus on the literature of the time in which the original arguments were presented to help illuminate the position.

A. Developmental Approaches

Lawrence Kohlberg's main work, *The Philosophy of Moral Development* (1981), postulates that all human beings develop morally as they pass through six stages of moral growth. These stages are inviolable even though the exact experience varies for each person. The stages are given in three levels of moral development (using Kohlberg's numerical system; pp. 409-412).

Level A) Preconventional Level

1) The stage of punishment and obedience

2) The stage of individual instrumental purpose and exchange

Level B) Conventional Level

3) The stage of mutual expectations, relationships and conformity

4) The stage of social system, duty and social conscience

Level C) Postconventional Level

5) The stage of prior rights and social contract

6) The stage of universal ethical principles

This pattern of growth comes from experience of life; thus the pattern is inductively derived. Kohlberg's approach will be explained in more detail.

By way of introduction it will be helpful to see what Kohlberg thinks of Dewey and the progressives, since he interacts with them often. The progressives' philosophical

method differs from the approaches of philosophers of other earlier educational persuasions in that the progressive or developmental method is partly empirical rather than purely analytic or theoretical (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 86). It combines a conception of development with a prior notion of an ethical standard of adequacy, but these notions can be revised in light of the facts, including the facts of human moral development. Thus, Kohlberg feels the developmental movement is basically empirical, rather than purely theoretical.

This empirical starting point also affects how Kohlberg views the certainty of his approach. If the facts of development do not indicate that individuals move toward philosophically desired principles of justice, then the initial philosophic definition of the direction of development is in error and must be revised. The analytic and normative "ought" of the developmental philosopher must take into account the facts of development, but is not simply a translation of these facts. Kohlberg believes that all human beings move toward a set of values he calls principles of justice.

This method of "empirical" or "experimental" grounding of philosophy is espe-cially important for any educational philosophy which will prescribe educational aims in developmental terms (Fowler, 1980; Rest, 1983; Noddings, 1984; Munsey, 1986; Sapp, 1986). Philosophical principles cannot be stated as ends or goals of education until they can be stated psychologically. This means translating them into statements about a more adequate stage of development. To make a genuine statement of an educational end, the educational philosopher must coordinate notions of principles with understanding of the facts of development (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 86).

Concerning the aim of education Kohlberg says, "We have attempted to clarify

and justify the basic claim that developmental criteria are the best ones for defining educationally important behavior changes. We need now to clarify how the psychological study of development can concretely define educational goals."(Kohlberg, 1981, p. 86).

Kohlberg faces two criticisms from the literature. First, a common criticism is that the concept of development is too vague genuinely to clarify the choice of the curricular content and aims of education. A second, related, criticism is that the concept of development, with its connotation of the "natural," is unsuited to determine actual educational policy and curriculum theory.

With regard to the issue of vagueness, if the concept of development is to aid in selecting educational aims and content, this assumes that only some behavior changes, out of many, can be labeled "developmental." Kohlberg needs to justify this assumption and to clarify more inclusive conditions for developmental change.

1. Kohlberg's Defense of a Developmental Approach

Kohlberg's position was challenged early with claims that determining whether or not a behavior change is "development" is a matter of theory, not an empirical issue. For example, Piagetian research shows that fundamental arithmetical reasoning (awareness of one-to-one correspondence, of inclusion of a larger class in a subclass, of addition and subtraction as inverse operations), usually develops naturally, without formal instruction or schooling; that is, it constitutes development. Such reasoning can also be explicitly taught, however, following various non-developmental learning theories. Accordingly, for example, to call fundamental arithmetical reasoning "developmental" does not define it as a developmental educational objective distinct

from non-developmental objectives such as rote knowledge of the multiplication tables.

In answer, Kohlberg says that if a given process is developmental, that does not preclude that the process can be taught to some who are ready to learn it, but have not done so yet; or that those who possibly may have learned it did not do so, and therefore it is most appropriate to teach it to them. The cognitive-developmental position claims that developmental behavior change is: irreversible, general over a field of responses, sequential, and hierarchical (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 87).

When a set of behavior changes meets all these criteria, changes are termed stages or structural reorganizations. A specific area of behavioral change such as fundamental arithmetical reasoning may or may not meet these criteria. Engelmann claims to have artificially taught children the "naturally developing" operation of conservation, but Kamii (1971) found that the children so taught met Engelmann's criteria of conservation without meeting the criteria of development. For example, the response could be later forgotten or unlearned, and it was not generalized.

Kohlberg responds that when a set of responses taught artificially do not meet the criteria of natural development, this is not because educational intervention is generally incompatible with developmental change. It is because the particular intervention is found to mimic development rather than to stimulate it. The issue of whether an educational change warrants the label development is a question for empirical examination, not simply a matter of theory (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 87).

Kohlberg had claimed that development can occur either naturally or as the result of a planned educational program (Kohlberg, 1968). As discussed earlier, development depends on experience. It is true, however, that the way in which experience stimulates

development (through discrepancy and match between experience events and information-processing structures) is not the way experience is programmed in many forms of instructions and educational intervention (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 88).

Because the experiences necessary for structural development are believed to be universal, it is possible for the child to develop the behavior naturally, without planned instruction. But the facts that only about half of the adult American population fully reach Piaget's stage of formal operational reasoning, and only 5 percent reach the highest moral stage demonstrate that natural or universal forms of development are not inevitable, but depend on experience (Liberman, 1986).

Such a model of "development" does not constitute development in the sense of a universal sequence or in the sense of growth of some general aspect of personality. As stated by Dewey (1938, p. 75): "That a man may grow in efficiency as a burglar ... cannot be doubted. But from the standpoint of growth as education and education as growth the question is whether such growth promotes or retards growth in general."

Kohlberg comes at these same objections from another perspective. "Although a coherent argument has been made for why universal developmental sequences define something of educational value, we need to consider why such sequences comprise the ultimate criteria of educational value. We also need to consider how they relate to com-peting educational values." (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 88). How does universal structural development as an educational aim relate to ordinary definitions of information and skills central to the educational curriculum? Many changes are of values that are not universal values in development.

As an example, while many unschooled people have learned to read, the

capacity and motivation to read does not define a developmental universal; nonetheless, it seems to us a basic educational objective. We cannot dispose of "growth in reading" as an educational objective, as we could "growth in burglary," simply because it is not a universal in development. But we argue that the ultimate importance of learning to read can only be understood in the context of more universal forms of development (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 88).

Increased capacity to read is not itself a development, although it is an attainment reflecting various aspects of development.

The value or importance of reading lies in its potential contribution to further cognitive, social, and esthetic development. As stated by Dewey:

No one can estimate the benumbing and hardening effect of continued drill in reading as mere form. It should be obvious that what I have in mind is not a Philistine attack upon books and reading. The question is not how to get rid of them, but how to get their value - how to use them to their capacity as servants of the intellectual and moral life. To answer this question, we must consider what is the effect of growth in a special direction upon the attitudes and habits which alone open up avenues for development in other lines (1898, p. 29).

A developmental definition of educational objectives must cope not only with competing objectives, usually defined non-developmentally, but also with the fact that the universal aspects of development are multiple.

As an example, Kamii (1971) has defined a program of preschool intervention related to each of the chapter headings of Piaget's books: space, time, causality, number, classification, and so on. Kamii's intent in making use of all the areas of cognitive

development discussed by Piaget is not to imply that each constitutes a separate, intrinsic educational objective. Rather, her interest is to make use of all aspects of the child's experience relevant to general Piagetian cognitive development.

The developmental-level concept of intelligence does provide a standard or a set of aims for preschool education. It does not assume a concept of fixed capacity or "intelligence quotient" constant over development. In this sense, developmental level is more like "achievement" than like "capacity," but developmental level tests differ from achievement tests in several ways. Although the developmental-level concept does not distinguish between achievement and capacity, it does distinguish between cognitive achievement (performance) and cognitive process (or competence). Kohlberg discusses the application of this distinction, as follows. "Developmental tests measure level of thought process, not the difficulty or correctness of thought product. They measure not cognitive performance but cognitive competence; the basic possession of a core concept, not the speed and agility with which the concept is expressed or used under rigid test conditions." (Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 89-90) In practice, psychometric and developmental measures are highly correlated with one another. This helps explain why clear theoretical and operational distinctions between the two concepts of intelligence have not been made in the literature until recently.

There is also a common factor to all developmental level tests. This factor is independent of general intelligence or of any special psychometric ability (Gardner, 1983). In other words, it is possible to distinguish between psychometric capacity and developmental-level concepts or measures of intelligence. Given the empirical distinction, cognitive stage measures provide a rational standard for educational

intervention where psychometric intelligence tests do not. This is true according to

Kohlberg for the following reasons:

1. The core structure defined by stage tests is in theory and experiment more

    amenable to educational intervention. Piagetian theory is a theory of

    stage movement occurring through experience of structural disequilibrium.

2. Piagetian performance predicts later development independent of a fixed

    biological rate or capacity factor, as demonstrated by evidence for

    longitudinal stability or prediction independent of IQ. Because Piaget items

    define invariant sequences, development to one stage facilitates

    development to the next.

3   Piagetian test content has cognitive value in its own right. If children are

    able to think causally about phenomena, for instance, their ability has a

    cognitive value apart from arbitrary cultural demands.

4. This cognitive value is culturally universal, the sequence of development

    occurs in every culture and subculture (Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 90-91).

The existence of a general level factor in cognitive development allows us to put specific

universal sequences of cognitive development into perspective as educational aims.

The worth of a development in any particular cognitive sequence is determined by its

contribution to the whole of cognitive development.

It is important to consider the relation of developmental aims of education to the

notion of developmental acceleration as an educational objective. A concept of stages

as "natural" does not mean that they are inevitable; many individuals fail to attain the

higher stages of logical and moral reasoning. Accordingly, the aim of the

developmental educator is the eventual adult attainment of the highest stage. In this sense, the developmentalist is not interested in stage acceleration, but in avoiding stage retardation, and in the post-readiness development of those who have been retarded.

Moral development research suggests that there is what approaches an optimal period for movement from one stage to the next. When children have just attained a given stage, they are unlikely to respond to stimulation toward movement to the next stage. In addition, after a long period of use of a given stage of thought, children tend to "stabilize" at that stage and develop screening mechanisms for contradictory stimulation. Accordingly, it has been found that both very young and older children at a given stage (compared to the age norm for that stage) are less responsive or less able to assimilate stimulation at the next higher stage than children at the age norm for that stage (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 91). The notion of an "open period" is not age specific, it is individual. A child late in reaching Stage 2 may be "open" to Stage 3 at an age beyond that of another child who reached Stage 2 earlier. Nevertheless, gross age periods may be defined that are "open periods" for movement from one stage to the next. Avoidance of retardation as an educational aim means presenting stimulation in these periods where the possibility for development is still open.

2. Stages of Moral Development

Kohlberg has so far discussed development only as general cognitive de-velopment. According to cognitive-developmental theory, there is always a cognitive component to development, even in social, moral, and esthetic areas. Development, however, is broader than cognitive-logical development. One central area is moral development, which may be defined by Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning. These

stages have a cognitive component; attainment of a given Piaget cognitive stage is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the parallel moral stage.

Moral reasoning stages also relate to action; principled moral reasoning has been found to be a precondition for principled moral action (see Kohlberg, 1981, Chapter 4). The stimulation of moral development through the stages represents a rational and ethical focus of education related to, but broadening, an educational focus on cognitive development. Programs effective in stimulating moral development have been successfully demonstrated.

Kohlberg again relates his approach to Dewey. "This chapter essentially recapitulates the progressive position first formulated by John Dewey. Our position has been clarified psychologically by the work of Piaget and his followers; its philosophic premises have been advanced by the work of such modern analytic philosophers as Hare, Rawls, and Peters." (1981, p. 92)

The progressive view of education, in the tradition of Dewey and Kohlberg, makes the following claims:

1. That the aims of education may be identified with development, both intellectual and moral.

2. That education so conceived supplies the conditions for passing through an order of connected stages.

3. That such a developmental definition of educational aims and processes requires both the method of philosophy and the method of psychology. In addition, before one can define a set of educational goals based on a philosophical statement of ethical,

scientific, or logical principles, one must be able to translate it into a statement about psychological stages of development.

4.   This, in turn, implies that the understanding of logical and ethical principles is a central aim of education. This understanding is the philosophic counterpart of the psychological statement that the aim of education is the development of the individual through cognitive and moral stages.

5.   The democratic educational end for all humans must be the development of a free and powerful character. Nothing less than democratic education will prepare free people for factual and moral choices that they will inevitably confront in society. Democratic educators must be guided by a set of psychological and ethical principles that they openly present to their students, inviting criticism as well as understanding.

6.   A notion of education for development and education for principles is liberal, democratic, and non-indoctrinative. It relies on open methods of stimulation through a sequence of stages, in a direction of movement that is universal for all children. (This list is modified from Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 92-93).

In Kohlberg's construction the progressive position appears idealistic rather than pragmatic. But Dewey's early democratic idealism is supported, Kohlberg thinks, by Piagetian psychological findings, which indicate that all children, not only well-born college students, are "philosophers" intent on organizing their lives into universal patterns of meaning. It is supported by findings that most students seem to move forward in developmentally oriented educational programs.

3. Philosophical Issues

Kohlberg also related his work to the more theoretical work of Rawls (1971; 1985; Rawls' position will be discussed more fully in the third section of this chapter). A statement of aims useful to education can be translated into psychological observations of educational gains by students. If it is to escape the psychologist's fallacy, however, this psychological statement of development as an intrinsic educational goal must be independently grounded in warranted reasoning on why a higher stage is a better stage.

This approach could be accused of deriving a moral ought, a set of valid moral principles, from the psychological theory and research. In fact, says Kohlberg:

> my own process of reasoning starts with philosophic assumptions as guides in the search for facts about moral development. Because philosophy enters into the endeavor at the start of empirical inquiry, it is not surprising that it emerges again in the form of conclusions from the empirical findings. In my view, progress in moral philosophy and in moral psychology occurs through a spiral or bootstrapping process in which the insights of philosophy serve to suggest insights and findings in psychology that in turn suggest new insights and conclusions in philosophy. (Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 97-98).

Kohlberg's central assumption is that there is no philosophically neutral starting point for the psychological study of morality.

Cultural relativism, which claims to be a philosophically neutral starting point, is itself a moral philosophy of ethical relativism, which he claims is philosophically incorrect, not philosophically neutral (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 98). Certainly the study of facts about moral beliefs and practices requires a degree of objectivity. He argues,

however, that the objective study of the history and development of moral ideas must be guided by reflective rational standards and principles of morality, just as objective study of the development of scientific ideas must be guided by reflective conceptions of scientific method and principles.

Kohlberg did not at first claim that the structural-developmental theory is culturally universal in the sense of being grounded in, and acceptable to, all cultures. Therefore, his claim is not that the stage-theory is universal among cultures but that the basic moral principles are universal:

> I claim that those who attain stage 5 (or 6) in any culture attempt to formulate universalizable principles and that the principles they formulate are recognizably similar from one culture to the next. Any social science theory, whether this one or some other theory that rejects stages, must still acknowledge this universality. In this regard, my theory is like many other philosophic theories that argue for 'methodological non-relativism." Methodological non-relativism is the doctrine that certain criteria (importantly, reversibility or universalizability) of moral reasoning or principles are universally relevant. It means that, even if there are observed cultural divergences of moral standards, there are rational principles and methods that can reconcile these divergences or lead to agreement. (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 98)

In asserting universal principles of justice, Kohlberg and Rawls come to a similar conclusion as does Rokeach (1973).

The theoretical delineation of Kohlberg's principles of justice and their stages of growth are not final dogmatic conclusions; they are reshaped by continuing advances in

social science research and in moral philosophy. Here again, he keeps separate the claim of universality and adequacy of moral principles from the universality and adequacy of moral theory, which is open to revision.

The formal features of a moral stage may be stated in terms of the kind of balance or equilibrium it attains. Each higher stage achieves a higher degree of equilibrium than its predecessor (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 98). In structural theory, progressive equilibration is basic to both psychological explanations of moral change and to philosophic treatment of the adequacy of a moral principle or lines of argument for a set of moral principles.

For Rawls, by contrast, principles of justice may represent an equilibrium among competing claims. Justice, however, represents equilibrium only under certain assumptions, in particular the assumptions that each player is choosing from an "original position" before the establishment of a society or a practice and is choosing under a "veil of ignorance," so that no one knows his or her position in the society. Specifically, this decision process leads to the difference principle: no inequalities are justified unless they are acceptable to the person if he or she were in the most disadvantaged position.   Rawls's procedure, Kohlberg argues (1981, p. 99), is equivalent to a "moral musical chairs" mode of decision making that is the ultimate extension of the Golden Rule. This procedure for choice leads in many situations to a utilitarian solution.

Rawls (1971, 1985) claims that moral principles are best formulated through an interactive process of "reflective equilibrium." Principles codify existing moral intuitions, but in new cases our intuitions may clash with older principles. As a result, there is a to-

and-fro process of revising our principles and of reconsidering our intuitions until the two correspond, for a time, in a situation.

Kohlberg's discussion of the claims to adequacy of the highest stage, stage 6, is philosophical and theoretical. At this point, his empirical findings do not clearly delineate a sixth stage.

My colleagues and I believe Stage 5 is firmly established by longitudinal studies carried out in the United States, Turkey, and Israel. None of our longitudinal subjects, however, have reached the highest stage. Our examples of Stage 6 come either from historical figures or from interviews with people who have extensive philosophic training. We are continuing to collect longitudinal data on adults to clarify empirically the existence and description of Stage 6. In the meantime, Stage 6 is perhaps less a statement of an attained psychological reality than the specification of a direction in which, our theory claims, ethical development is moving. (1981, p. 100).

Later (Power, Higgens, & Kohlberg, 1989), Kohlberg firmly asserted the evidence for, and therefore the existence of, a sixth stage (but cf. Edington, 1990).

Conclusion

Kohlberg set forth an agenda regarding moral development and stages of development which he thought had been empirically demonstrated in a manner similar to Piaget's in cognitive development. The six stages become a matrix for evaluating both individual and social development and for projecting common absolute values. He does not determine the origin of such values, but he does identify their existence.

B. Empirical Approaches

Since empirical data is the foundation for a theoretical system, proportionally more space will be spent on this section than on the other sections in this chapter. By far the best at researching values empirically is Milton Rokeach, a sociologist. Rokeach (1973) began his studies with over 100 value keywords and examined hundreds of people. He then did factor analysis to eliminate words which were mutually predictable of each other, and retested. The eventual result was a list of eighteen terminal values and eighteen instrumental values which are common to people across many national and cultural groups. The terminal values are the central deep values which individuals hold. The instrumental values represent the choices of methods for bringing into real life the goals of the terminal values.

Rokeach reports (1973, 1979) that people and cultures all over the world (he actually reports on four countries in addition to the U. S.) seem to hold the same eighteen values. The differences between people and cultures is in how they rank order the values. The first three to six values a person lists tend to be the major determiners of the attitude, opinion, and preference choices the person makes. The order of these values tend to occur in social/ cultural groups and to differ significantly across groups.

1. Criteria for Values

Rokeach thinks that any conception of the nature of human values should satisfy at least certain criteria. It should clearly distinguish the value concept from other concepts with which it might be confused - such concepts as attitude, social norm, and need - and yet it should be systematically related to such concepts. It should avoid circular terms that are themselves undefined, such terms as "ought, should," or

"conceptions of the desirable." It should, moreover, represent a value-free approach to the study of human values; that is, an approach that would enable independent investigators to replicate reliably one another's empirical findings and conclusions (Rokeach, 1973, introduction).

These formulations were based by five assumptions about the nature of human values: (l) the total number of values that a person possesses is relatively small; (2) all people everywhere possess the same values to different degrees (3) values are organized into value systems; (4) the antecedents of human values can be traced in a large degree to culture (society and its institutions), and personality; (5) the consequences of human values will be manifested in virtually all phenomena that social scientists might consider worth investigating and understanding. These assumptions also represent for Rokeach a set of reasons for arguing that the value concept, more than any other, should occupy a central position across all the social sciences- sociology, anthropology, psychology, psychiatry, political science, education, economics, and history (Rokeach, 1973, p. 2).

The concept of value has been employed in two distinctively different ways in human discourse. It is often said that a person "has a value" but also that an object "has value." These two usages, which have been explicitly recognized by writers from various disciplines,   require at the outset a decision whether a systematic study of values will turn out to be more fruitful if it focuses on the values that people are said to have or on the values that objects are said to have.

Behaviorist B. F. Skinner has vigorously denied that people possess values and has instead argued that "the reinforcing effects of things are the province of behavioral

science, which, to the extent that it is concerned with operant reinforcement, is a science of values" (1971, p. 104).

Are there theoretical grounds for deciding which approach is likely to be the more fruitful? Robin Williams, who has explicitly raised the same question as Rokeach, has remarked that "Value-as-criterion is usually a more important usage for purposes of social scientific analysis" (1968, p. 283). One implication that follows from Williams' observation is that the number of values that a person possesses is likely to be reasonably small. If the number of human values is relatively small, and if all humans everywhere possess them, comparative cross-cultural investigations of values would then become considerably easier also.

The comparison with four other countries provides an interesting approach. There are very significant divergences from the set of values found in the U.S. Family security does not occur in the top six on any list except the U.S., and world peace only occurs in the top six on one other list. Self-respect is on two other lists in the top six and freedom is on all four other lists (Rokeach, 1973).

Assuming that Rokeach is correct that the top six values tend to characterize the value set of a person (Krathwold, 1964) or culture (Thompson, Ellis, Wildavsky, 1990), then people in the U.S. value family security and world peace more than any other people studied. Wisdom, friendship, and mature love are values more highly rated by all other nations than by the U.S. These seem to be more personal values; they occur in the middle range for U.S. scores but not in the top six.

It seems, therefore, that there are compelling reasons for assuming that the study of a person's values is likely to be much more useful for social analysis than a

study of the values that objects are said to have. Williams' argument makes sense on grounds of theoretical economy and social relevance and for other reasons as well. Rokeach has suggested elsewhere (Rokeach, 1979), when comparing the relative power of the value concept as against other concepts, that by focusing upon a person's values "we would be dealing with a concept that is more central, more dynamic, more economical, a concept that would invite a more enthusiastic interdisciplinary collaboration, and that would broaden the range of the social psychologist's traditional concern to include problems of education and reeducation as well as problems of persuasion" (p. 159).

With the preceding considerations in mind, Rokeach offers the following definitions of what it means to say that a person has a value and a value system (1973, p. 43):

I. A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence.

II. A value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance.

These definitions, from which such terms as "ought," "should," and "conceptions of the desirable" have been deliberately excluded, are central to Rokeach's work.   If values were completely stable, individual and social change would be impossible. If values were complete, growth in personality and society would not take place. All conception of human values, if it is to be fruitful, must be able to account for the

enduring character of values as well as for their changing character.

Rokeach thinks that as a child matures, he is increasingly likely to encounter social situations in which several values come into competition with one another, requiring a weighing of one value against another - a decision as to which value is the more important. In a particular situation, is it better, for instance, to seek success or to remain honest, to act obediently or independently, to seek self-respect or social recognition? Gradually, through experience and a process of maturation all people learn absolute values in an organized system (cf. also Rawls, 1971), wherein each value is ordered in priority or importance relative to other values (Rokeach, 1973, p. 44). Rokeach does not think that the pattern of empirical development follows a strictly stage approach, such as that of Kohlberg.

When people think about, talk about, or try to teach one of their values to others, they typically do so without focusing on their other values, thus regarding them functionally as independent absolutes. But when one value is actually activated along with others in a given situation, the behavioral outcome will be a result of the relative importance of all the competing values that the situation has activated. In other words people will act consistently with the hierarchy of values which are already within them and are activated in a given circumstance.

It is this relative-in-action conception of values together with the stable/ changing dynamic of contexts that differentiates Rokeach's approach most distinctively from other approaches to the study of values. Such a combination is crucial for the theory and for experimental work on long-term value change, and it is also crucial for the strategy for measuring values.

Three types of beliefs have been distinguished (Rokeach, 1973):

1) descriptive or existential beliefs, when the object is judged to be real;

2) evaluative beliefs, where the object of belief is judged good or bad;

   3) prescriptive or proscriptive beliefs, where some means or end of action

   is judged desirable or undesirable.

In Rokeach's study a value is a belief of the third kind - a prescriptive belief.

A value is a cognition about the desirable. A value is affective in that one can feel emotional about it, be affectively for or against it, approve of positive instances and disapprove of negative instances of it. A value has a behavioral component in the sense that it is an intervening variable that leads to action when activated. This approach follows Krathwold's theory in relating the emotional to the valuational dimensions within the affective domain (1964). As the beliefs (values) come to be habitual the person is said to be characterized by the set of values. Kohlberg and Rawls do make judgments about the worth of the values and the evaluation of the character of the person exercising such values.

When it is said that a person has a value, this may refer either to his beliefs concerning desirable modes of conduct or to desirable end-states of existence. These are referred to by Rokeach as instrumental and terminal values.

This distinction between the two kinds of values - instrumental and terminal - is an important one that cannot be ignored either in theoretical thinking or in attempts to measure values. There is a functional relationship between instrumental and terminal values that cannot be ignored.

The concept of moral values is considerably narrower than the general concept

of values. For one thing, instrumental values refer mainly to modes of behavior and do not necessarily judge fundamental values that concern end-states.

Behaving honestly and responsibly leads one to feel that he is behaving morally, whereas behaving logically, intelligently or imaginatively leads one to feel that he is behaving competently. A person may experience conflict between two moral values (e.g., behaving honestly and lovingly), between two competence values (e.g., imaginatively and logically), or between a moral and a competence value (e.g., to act politely-and to offer intellectual criticism).

Is there a close connection between the two kinds of instrumental values, concerning morality and competence, and the two kinds of terminal values, concerning social and personal end-states? Will persons who place a higher priority on social end-states also place a higher priority on moral values? It might appear at first glance that the answer to this question is "yes," that the common thread running across the two kinds of terminal and instrumental values is an intra-personal or interpersonal orientation. Such a simple one-to-one relationship cannot be expected. A person who is more oriented toward personal end-states may, for example, defensively place a higher priority on moral behavior. A person who is more oriented toward the social may also have a strong drive for personal competence, reflected in a greater priority placed on competence values. There is thus reason to doubt that there is any simple one-to-one connection between the two kinds of terminal and instrumental values.

The "oughtness" of certain values may originate within society as custom or law, which demands that all people behave in certain ways that do not harm others. It is an objective demand that people perceive society to place upon others no less than upon

themselves in order to ensure that all people live out their lives in a social milieu within which people can trust and depend upon one another. There can be little point in one person's behaving morally unless others also behave morally. In contrast, society seems less insistent that competent modes of behavior exist concerning terminal end-states. Such values do not seem to be characterized by the same amount of "oughtness" that characterizes moral values. At most, there is a more subdued experience of "oughtness" (Rokeach, 1973, p. 9).

A value represents a specific preference. A person prefers a particular mode or end-state not only when compared it to its opposite but also when compared with other aims within a value system. A particular mode or end-state is preferred to other modes or end-states that are lower down in a value hierarchy. This relates Rokeach's value model to Krathwold's affective objectives (1964).

If a person's values represent a "conceptions of the desirable," the question arises: desirable for whom?   When a person tells about her/his values, it cannot be assumed that she necessarily intends them to apply equally to all people. Consider, for example, the meaning of that familiar expression: "Children should be seen and not heard." Translated into the language of values, this statement apparently means to the person asserting it: "I believe it is desirable for children but not for adults to behave in certain ways." A person who informs us about inner values may or may not intend to apply them differentially to young and old, men and women, blacks and whites, rich and poor, and so on.

The first person to construct a systematic organization of values was Krathwold in 1964. He theorized that when a value is learned it becomes integrated into some

system of values wherein each value is ordered in priority with respect to other values.

Such a relative conception of values enables change to be defined as re-ordering of priorities and, at the same time, to see the total value system as relatively stable over time. It is stable enough to reflect the fact of sameness and continuity of a unique position within a given culture and society, yet unstable enough to permit rearrangements of value priorities as a result of changes in culture, society, and personal experience.

Variations in personal, societal, and cultural experience will not only generate individual differences in value systems but also individual differences in their stability. Both kinds of individual differences can be expected as a result of differences in such variables as intellectual development, degree of internalization of cultural and institutional values, identification with sex roles, political identification, and religious upbringing (Rokeach, 1973, p. 10).

Certain theoretical considerations help Rokeach bring an approximation of the total number of values. It can be argued that the number of values is roughly equal to or limited by mankind's biological and social makeup and particularly by his needs. "The total number of terminal values may range somewhere between Freud's two and Murray's twenty-eight and that the total number of instrumental values may be several times this number." (Rokeach, 1973).

What can be said about the relation between instrumental and terminal values? They represent two separate yet functionally interconnected systems, wherein all the values concerning modes of behavior are instrumental to the attainment of all the values concerning end-states. This instrumentality is not necessarily a consciously perceived

instrumentality, and there is not necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between any one instrumental value and any one terminal value.

One way to approach the question: "what functions do values serve?" is to think of values as standards that guide ongoing activities, and of value systems as general plans employed to make decisions and to resolve conflict.

Since a given situation will typically activate several values within a person's value system rather than just a single one, it is unlikely that a person will be able to behave in a manner that is equally compatible with all of them. A given situation may, for example, activate a conflict between behaving independently and obediently or between behaving politely and sincerely; another situation may activate a conflict between strivings for salvation and hedonic pleasure or between self-respect and respect from others. Krathwold and Kohlberg agree that a value system is an organization of principles and rules to help one choose between alternatives.

This is not to suggest, however, that a person's total value system is ever fully activated in any given situation. It is an internal structure that is more comprehensive than that portion of it that a given situation may activate. It is a generalized plan that can perhaps best be likened to a map or architect's blueprint. Only that part of the map or blueprint that is immediately relevant is consulted, and the rest is ignored for the moment. Different subsets of the map or blueprint are activated in different social situations.

If the immediate functions of values and value systems are to guide human action in daily situations, their more long-range functions are to give expression to basic human needs. Values have a strong motivational component as well as cognitive,

affective, and behavioral components. Instrumental values are motivating because they represent the idealized modes of attainment of desired end-goals. If people behave in all the ways of their instrumental values, they will be rewarded with all the end-states specified by terminal values. Values are in the final analysis the tools and weapons that all people employ in order to maintain an end. Any given attitude need not, however, serve all these functions and it may serve various combinations of these functions.

2. The Function of Values

People value such end-states as wisdom and accomplishment, and such modes of behavior as behaving independently, consistently, and competently.

Thus far Rokeach's discussion has avoided labeling certain values as better or of a higher order than others. Rokeach did this in the hope of demonstrating that it is possible to describe the values that people hold in a value-free manner.

But it is possible that values serving adjustive, ego-defensive, knowledge and self-actualization functions may well be ordered along a continuum ranging from lower-order values suggested by Maslow's well-known hierarchical orders of motivation (1964; 1970): safety, security, love, self-esteem, and self-actualization needs. Maslow also speaks of B (being) values and D (deficiency) values, and in doing so he is proposing that certain values are better, higher, more desirable for psychological fulfillment than others.

It looks as if there were an ultimate value for mankind, a goal toward which all men strive. This is called by different authors: self-actualization, self-realization, integration, individuation, autonomy, creativity, productivity; but they all agree that this amounts to realizing the potentialities of the person, becoming fully human, everything

that the person can become. The value concept employed by Maslow differs, however, in certain respects from the one presented by Rokeach. Maslow employs it in a manner that is more or less synonymous with the concept of need, drawing no distinction between instrumental and terminal values and dealing more with what has been identified here as end-states than with modes of behavior. To the extent that a person's value system reflects a differential preoccupation with values that are adjustive, ego-defensive, and self-actualizing, that person is operating at lower or higher levels.

An attitude differs from a value in that an attitude refers to an organization of several beliefs around a specific object or situation. A value refers to a single belief of a very specific kind. It concerns a desirable mode of behavior or end-state that has a transcendental element to it, guiding actions, attitudes, and comparisons across specific situations and beyond immediate goals to more ultimate goals. So defined, values and attitudes differ in a number of important respects (Rokeach, 1973, p. 18).

A value is a single belief and an attitude refers to an organization of several beliefs that are all focused on a given object or situation. A value transcends objects and situations whereas an attitude is focused on some specified object or situation. A value is a standard but an attitude is not a standard. Favorable or unfavorable evaluations of numerous attitude objects and situations may be based upon a relatively small number of values serving as standards.

Both the developmental theorists and Rokeach agree that a person has as many values as each has learned beliefs concerning desirable modes of conduct and end-states of existence, and as many attitudes as direct or indirect encounters with specific objects and situations. It is thus estimated that values number only in the dozens,

whereas attitudes number in the thousands (cf. Rokeach, 1979).

Values often occupy a more central position than attitudes within one's personality makeup and cognitive system, and they are therefore determinants of attitudes as well as of behavior.

Closely related is the notion of perceived instrumentality. A particular attitude is perceived to be instrumental to the attainment of one or more values; a change in a subject's perceived instrumentality for one or more values should lead to a change in attitude; linking a particular attitude to more important values should make it more resistant to change than linking it to less important values. Value is a more dynamic concept than attitude, having a more immediate link to motivation. If an attitude also has a motivational component, this is so only because the object or situation is perceived to be positively or negatively instrumental to value attainment. The substantive content of a value may directly concern ego defense, knowledge or self-actualizing functions while the content of an attitude is related to such functions only inferentially (Rokeach, 1973, pp. 18-19).

There are three ways in which values differ from social norms. First, a value suggests transcendent norms and a social norm refers only to a mode of being apart from transcendent meanings. Second, a social norm is a prescription or proscription to behave in a specific way in a specific situation. Americans should stand respectfully at attention when the "Star Spangled Banner" is played at a public gathering but not when it is played in one's home. Third, a value is more personal and internal, whereas a norm is consensual and external to the person.

If some writers regard values and attitudes as more or less equivalent, others

regard values and needs as equivalent. Maslow, for instance, refers to self-actualization both as a need and as a higher-order value (1964). If values are indeed equivalent to needs, as Maslow and many others have suggested, then the rat, to the extent that it can be said to possess needs, should to the same extent also be said to possess values. If such a view were adopted, Rokeach thinks (1973, p. 20), it would be difficult to account for the fact that values are so much at the center of attention among those concerned with the understanding of human behavior and so little at the center of attention among those concerned with the understanding of animal behavior. That values are regarded to be so much more central in the one case than in the other suggests that values cannot altogether be identical to needs and perhaps that values possess some attributes that needs do not.

The cognitive representation of needs as values serves societal demands no less than individual needs. Once such demands and needs become cognitively transformed into values, they are capable of being defended, justified, advocated, and exhorted as personally and socially desirable. Thus, when a person tells about his values, s/he is also telling about felt needs.

C. Assumptions of a Value System

First, Rokeach assumes that there is a limited number of common human problems for which all peoples at all times must find some solution. This is the universal aspect of value orientations because the common human problems to be treated arise inevitably out of the human situation. A second assumption is that while there is variability in solutions of all the problems, it is neither limitless nor random but is definitely variable within a range of possible solutions. A third assumption, the one

which provides the main key to the later analysis of variation in value orientations, is that all alternatives of all values are present in all societies at all times but are differentially preferred (Rokeach, 1973, pp. 23-24). Every society has, in addition to its dominant profile of value orientations, numerous variant or substitute profiles. In both the dominant and the variant profiles there is almost always a rank ordering of the preferences of the value-orientation alternatives.

The values that are internalized as a result of cultural, societal, and personal experience are psychological structures, which in turn, have consequences of their own. Values are determinants of virtually all kinds of behavior that could be called social behavior: of social action, attitudes and ideology, evaluations, moral judgments and justifications of self and others, comparisons of self with others, presentations of self to others, and attempts to influence others.

Is there some compelling theoretical basis for systematic classification of values? A reasonable point of departure for such an attempt at classification is the observation that it is just as meaningful to speak of institutional values as of individual values. Every human value is a "social product" that has been transmitted and preserved in successive generations through one or more of society's institutions. An institution is a social organization that has evolved in society and has been "assigned" the task of specializing in the maintenance and enhancement of selected subsets of values and in their transmission from generation to generation (Rokeach, 1973, p. 25). Thus, religious institutions are institutions that specialize in furthering a certain subset of values that are called religious values; the family is an institution that specializes in furthering another subset of values; educational, political, economic, and legal

institutions specialize in yet other subsets. The values that one institution specializes in are not necessarily completely different from those in which other institutions specialize. They may overlap and share certain values in common and thus reinforce each other's values, as in the case of the family and religious institutions. To the extent they do not overlap they will compete with one another, as in the case of religious and secular institutions within a society that insists on separation of church and state.

If the maintenance, enhancement, and transmission of values within a culture typically become institutionalized, then an identification of the major institutions of a society should give a reasonable point of departure for a comprehensive compilation of values.

4. Measurement of Values

Differences between cultures, social classes, occupations, religions, or political orientations are all translatable into questions concerning differences in underlying values and value systems. Differences between the generations, black and white Americans, and the rich and poor are all amenable to analysis in terms of value differences. Studies of change as a result of maturation, education, persuasion, therapy, and cultural, institutional, and technological change are all similarly capable of being formulated as questions concerning development and change in values and value systems. All of these specific changes can be measured.

To pose and answer a wide variety of questions such as these, considerable attention has been devoted by Rokeach to the development and standardization of a simple method for measuring values and value systems. Such a method would prove useful as a social indicator and have a wide variety of applications to psychology and

psychiatry, sociology and anthropology, political science and education.

One approach concerns the drawing of inferences about a person's values from his behavior in structured situations. This approach was rejected because it had too many drawbacks: it is time-consuming and expensive; it cannot be employed with large numbers of people; it is difficult to interpret and to quantify; and it may be biased by the observer's own values. A second approach is to ask a person to tell in her/his own words about personal values - a simple phenomenological approach. This was also rejected because it has drawbacks: A person might not be willing or able to tell about them, or might be highly selective in what is told (Rokeach, 1973, pp. 26-27).

To get around such limitations of the value clarification approach, Rokeach presented the respondent at the outset with previously constructed (and tested) lists of terminal and instrumental values, the only burden placed upon him is to rank them for personal importance. The two lists were designed to be reasonably comprehensive and were at the same time worded in a manner that would yield phenomenologically valid data.

The Value Survey

Rokeach Table I shows two lists of 18 alphabetically arranged instrumental and terminal values that resulted after several years of research. Each value is presented along with a brief definition in parentheses. The instruction to the respondent is to "arrange them in order of importance to YOU, as guiding principles in YOUR life." The ranking method assumes that it is not the absolute presence or absence of a value that is of interest but their relative ordering. Form E, one of the two final versions now being employed, presents the respondent with two mimeographed lists of 18 terminal and 18

instrumental values. The respondent ranks each list in order of importance by writing in numbers from 1 to 18. Form D of the Value Survey (Rokeach, 1967), the alternate form now being more widely used, presents each value printed on a removable gummed label. The respondent is instructed to:

Study the list carefully and pick out the one value which is the most important for you. Peel it off and paste it in Box I on the left. Then pick out the value which is second most important for you. Then do the same for each of the remaining values. The value which is least important goes in Box 18. Work slowly and think carefully. Feel free to change your answers. The end result should truly show how you really feel.

The respondent has only his own internalized system of values to tell him how to rank the 18 terminal and the 18 instrumental values.

Rokeach Table 1

Test-Retest Reliabilities Of 18 Terminal And 18 Instrumental Values

Terminal Value	r	Instrumental Value	r
A comfortable life	.70	Ambitious	.70
An exciting life	.73	Broadminded	.57
A sense of accomplishment	.51	Capable	.51
A world at peace	.67	Cheerfulness	.65
A world of beauty	.66	Clean	.66
Equality	.71	Courageous	.52
Family security	.64	Forgiving	.62
Freedom	.61	Helpful	.66

Happiness	.62	Honest	.62
Inner harmony	.65	Imaginative	.69
Mature love	.68	Independent	.60
National security	.67	Intellectual	.67
Pleasure	.57	Logical	.57
Salvation	.88	Loving	.65
Self-respect	.58	Obedient	.53
Social recognition	.65	Polite	.53
True friendship	.59	Responsible	.45
Wisdom	.60	Self-controlled	.52

A ceiling of 18 was imposed because it was felt to be too burdensome for respondents to rank-order more than 18 values and because the two lists of 18 terminal and 18 instrumental values were felt to be reasonably comprehensive.

The 18 terminal values are distilled from a much larger list obtained from various sources found in American society and in other societies. The number of values thus compiled - several hundred - was then reduced on the basis of one or another consideration: those values were eliminated which were judged to be more or less synonymous with one another (e.g., freedom and liberty, brotherhood of man and equality, peace of mind and inner harmony), those which were empirically known to be more or less synonymous (e.g., the correlation between rankings of salvation and unity with God was over .80), those which overlapped (e.g.. religion and salvation), those which were too specific (e.g., spousehood is more specific than family security), or those which simply did not represent end-states of existence (e.g., wisdom is an end-

state but education is not).

A very different procedure was followed in selecting the 18 - instrumental values. This time the point of departure was a list of *555* personality-trait words for which he has reported positive and negative evaluative ratings. Since interest is not in negative but in positive values that would be suitable for self-attribution, the list of 555 trait-names could be quickly reduced to about 200. The 18 instrumental values were selected from this list according to several criteria: by retaining only one from a group of synonyms or near-synonyms (e.g., helpful, kind, kindhearted, thoughtful, considerate, friendly, unselfish); by retaining those judged to be maximally different from or minimally intercorrelated with one another; by retaining those judged to represent the most important values in American society; by retaining those deemed to be maximally discriminating across social status, sex, race, age, religion, politics, etc.; by retaining those judged to be meaningful values in all cultures; and by retaining those one could readily admit to having without appearing to be immodest, vain, or boastful (thus eliminating such values as being brilliant, clever, ingenious, and charming) (Rokeach, 1973, pp. 29-30).

For terminal values the product-moment reliabilities range from .51 for a sense of accomplishment to .88 for salvation. Three of the 18 values have reliabilities in the .70's, ten have reliabilities in the .60's, and four are in the .50's. Their average reliability is .65. The reliabilities of the instrumental values are somewhat lower, averaging .60.

5. Change in Values

The fact of evident value change in various circumstances and value change over time is accepted in Rokeach's approach. His explanation of change is also based

on empirical data. Data about the change process come mainly from three sources: (1) independent reports by experimental subjects about their affective states, (2) interviews with experimental and control subjects after all the post-tests had been completed and (3) findings from other experiments specifically designed to answer certain questions about the process of change.

The basic mechanism that initiates a process of change is an affective state of self-dissatisfaction, which is induced when a person becomes aware of certain contradictions in his total belief system. The more such contradictions implicate select values, the more likely that they will induce self-dissatisfaction and the more likely that the ensuing changes will endure. Self-dissatisfaction will not arise if such contradictions do not exist or do not become apparent or, should they become apparent, they are denied or repressed. But if a person perceives such contradictions within himself as credible, his perception should generate self-dissatisfaction. To reduce or eliminate such self-dissatisfaction, a person will often find it necessary to realign values with self-conceptions (Rokeach, 1973, p. 286). Value change should in turn lead to a cognitive reorganization of the remaining values, and it should culminate finally in behavioral change. This implies that values can be taught and reinforced in the school environment.

Persons who are experimentally made aware of the fact that their value and attitudes contradict self-conceptions will more often experience self-dissatisfaction. It can therefore be concluded that an affective state of self-dissatisfaction with any value, for whatever reason, is likely to lead to a greater long-term change in that value than an affective state of self-satisfaction.

In experiments Rokeach did concerning value change the experimental subject first ranked his own values, and only then was he given comparable information about others. He was thus able to compare himself with others, and this comparison process presumably was crucial in leading many of the subjects to become aware of contradictions within their belief systems (Rokeach, 1973, p. 326).

What if, instead, the experimental subject were not allowed to find out first about his/her own values and was exposed only to information about others? Rokeach gave one experimental group information about others but not about themselves; that is, the experimental subjects were exposed to earlier findings from testing other subjects without first being given the opportunity of finding out about their own values. Findings for this experimental group were compared with those obtained under the usual experimental condition, wherein the subjects first ranked their own values and then were shown research findings. Significant changes in equality and freedom were obtained four weeks afterward in both experimental groups. Moreover, both experimental groups manifested greater behavioral change five months afterward when compared with a control group that had merely filled out the value scale but had not been exposed to research findings.

These data suggest that a process of long-term cognitive and behavioral change can be initiated even in persons before finding out about their own values and who, instead, are merely exposed to information about others. The experimental subjects evidently compared the objective information they received about others with what they guessed, imagined, or knew subjectively about themselves. In this way many of these experimental subjects must have become conscious of contradictions within their own

belief systems, even though they had been denied the opportunity of first finding out what their beliefs were (Rokeach, 1973, 327).

Another methodological implication derives from the fact that the Value Survey not only measures a person's own values but also the perceived values of others - other persons, groups, organizations, institutions, nations, and cultures. Corporate or organizational image can be conceptualized as a person's perception of the value system of a social organization. Discrepancies between abstract and perceived cognitive structures can be resolved in various ways in order to achieve a better fit between person and environment.

The greater the discrepancy between one's own and one's perception of societal values, the greater one's alienation. Similarly, a person's stereotypes of a cultural, racial, ethnic, or sexual group can be conceptualized as the values that are attributed to a particular group, and accuracy of stereotype can be conceptualized and measured as a discrepancy between perceived and actual value rankings.

The findings suggest that culture, society, and personality are the major antecedents of values, similar to the conclusions of Wildavsky (1987), and that attitudes and behavior are their major consequents. Virtually every comparison undertaken between groups differing in cultural, demographic, social class, or personality variables has uncovered distinctive value patterns. Thus, values seem to be implicated either as dependent or independent variables at virtually all levels of social analysis- cultural, institutional, group, and individual.

Different social institutions can be conceptualized as specializing in the enhancement of different subsets of values. The effects of Christian institutions are

reflected mainly as variations in salvation and forgiving, and the effects of political

institutions are reflected mainly as variations in equality and freedom.   Similarly, the

effects of educational, economic, and law enforcement institutions are reflected as

variations in yet other subsets of values. Thus, a person's total value system may be an

end result, at least in large part, of all the institutional forces or influences that have

acted upon him.

The data show a continual development of values from early youth to old age, a

finding that is more in accord with Erickson's (1950) than with Freud's psychosexual

view of personality development. Further research is now needed to describe more

clearly the value systems that are characteristic of Erikson's eight identity stages and to

determine the precise nature of the value changes that accompany change in stages of

identity.

Perhaps the most important theoretical implications of Rokeach's work are those

that are suggested by the extensive findings concerning long-term change in values,

attitudes, and behavior and those concerning the mechanisms leading to such changes.

That certain values and attitudes undergo lasting change even when they are consistent

with one another suggests that the crucial components that enter into psychologically

inconsistent relations have not been properly identified. Rokeach's work suggests that

psychological consistency does not concern any two relatable or related cognitions but

only the two cognitions that are present in every human situation: self-conceptions and

cognitions about performance.

Value change, and attitude and behavioral change that might follow value

change, can be initiated only by inducing an affective state of dis-satisfaction

concerning contradictions with self-conceptions. This is motivated by the desire at least to maintain and if possible to enhance conceptions of oneself as a moral and competent human being.

A person should undergo an increase or decrease in regard for any given value in only one direction, whichever direction will provide his self-conceptions with a certain mileage. In the final analysis, self-conceptions reflect social definitions of the self; self-conceptions can be maintained or enhanced within some social framework that defines how a person should behave and what he should strive for (Rokeach, 1973, pp. 328-29). The extent to which a person will think well of himself depends a great deal on the extent to which he thinks he satisfies the demands of certain social institutions, certain organizations or groups that he identifies with, and, in some instances, the demands of the total society.

Since value data are both intrinsically easy to understand and ego-involving for persons of various ages, educational levels, and occupations, they can be used to increase people's knowledge and understanding of themselves and others. The subjects in Rokeach's studies, and various student and adult audiences who have heard about the results of these studies, have usually been curious about their own value positions and how their own positions compare with those of other reference persons and groups. These audiences are typically most curious about the similarities and differences between groups varying in culture, social class, race, age, sex, occupation, ethnic, religious, and political identification and about persons espousing different positions on the salient issues of our time (Rokeach, 1973, p. 330).

People in everyday life will remain chronically unaware of whatever contradicting

beliefs they may have because most social circumstances will encourage camouflage and ego defense and few social circumstances will facilitate or force self-awareness. Data on the national sample collected in 1968 by Rokeach (1973, p. 332), for instance, reveal that about 18 percent of adult Americans who had preferred George Wallace in the presidential election had nonetheless ranked equality in the upper third of the 18-value scale. About one out of seven adult Americans who had ranked salvation in the upper third had nonetheless ranked forgiving in the lower third. About one out of ten adult Americans who had ranked independent in the upper third had also ranked obedient there. The practical implication of such findings is that the potential for increased self-awareness and change in the values, attitudes, and behavior of Americans would be very great if it were possible to bring implicit contradictions such as these to their conscious attention.

It is not necessary to assume, however, that value change can be induced only when target values are preselected by someone other than the subject. The experimental subjects who had expressed dissatisfaction with their rankings of virtually any value at the end of the experimental session had typically undergone more lasting change on that value than had those who had expressed satisfaction with their value rankings (Rokeach, 1973, 327). Over and above the increases that had been experimentally induced by focusing the subject's attention on the two target values, many other value rankings had changed, either increasing or decreasing in importance depending upon the nature of the dissatisfaction the subjects had experienced with one value or another. These findings suggest that the real impetus for value change comes ultimately from the subject rather than from the experimenter.

6. Ethical Implications

How is it possible ethically to defend psychological research that is intended to bring about more or less permanent change in a person's values and associated attitudes and behavior without his fully informed consent?   If we have indeed learned how to effect changes in values and associated attitudes and behavior, is it ethically permissible to apply these research findings to meet practical ends, for instance, to bring about changes in political or religious values, attitudes, and behavior? If so, what kinds of change in the real person? Who shall decide which values are ethically allowed? Who will decide the ethically permissible targets for change, and who shall decide the desirable directions of that change?

All such ethical issues seem to be reducible to two more fundamental questions: Is it ever permissible, in the scientific laboratory, in the classroom, or in the real world, to enduringly change other people without their fully informed consent? If so, what ethical criteria are to be employed as standards for deciding what is permissible and what is not?

In response to the first question, it may first be observed that every teacher who takes professional pride in his or her work would like to think that teaching has affected the values, attitudes, and behavior of students in some significant way. So long as he cannot prove that what he does in the classroom has in fact resulted in such change, his assertions that it has will go unnoticed and unchallenged. But as soon as he can demonstrate that his teaching methods have indeed resulted in enduring effects on his students, especially on their values, he risks the criticism that he is unethically manipulating them without their, or their parents', informed consent. Criticism will be

even more severe if the particular values the teacher has acted upon are considered to be the special prerogative of other social institutions, for instance, the family, the church, or political institutions.

Educational institutions have always been in the business of transmitting knowledge from one generation to the next and of shaping certain values in certain directions. They have also been in the business of producing new knowledge, including information about better teaching methods. But if it is granted that educational institutions shape values as well as produce new knowledge, then on both grounds research on better methods of shaping values deserves more research attention.

All social institutions can be thought to specialize in the shaping, enhancing, and changing of different subsets of values. For instance, the family, the church, and the military all see themselves as being legitimately concerned with the shaping of at least certain values, directions that are congruent with the institution's values. Parents, ministers, and military personnel consider themselves competent to the extent that they succeed in changing people's values. Thus, in answer to the first question raised above, not only educational institutions, but virtually every institution of society actually attempts to affect the values of those in its charge.

Ethical issues concerning informed consent typically do not arise, except perhaps when one social institution encroaches upon or threatens the values of other institutions.

Since all institutions do this, the second question becomes relevant: what ethical criteria are to be employed in scientific research and in practical applications when deciding which values may be acted upon and when deciding the direction of change?

In recent years, those engaged in research with human subjects have more or less universally accepted the proposition that ethical decisions concerning the welfare of human subjects should not be made solely by individual scientists. Research proposals by individual investigators involving the use of human subjects are increasingly subject to external review by committees selected from the wider academic community, to ensure that the welfare and rights of human subjects are protected and that the scientific gain that is anticipated clearly outweighs momentary inconvenience or harm to the subject. Ethical questions have been raised in such contexts not only about informed consent but also about invasion of privacy, the employment of deception, protection of confidentiality, physical and emotional harm to human subjects, the use of volunteers, and about debriefing and educational feedback.

It is appropriate to comment here on three major ethical criteria that have been especially pertinent in guiding experimental work concerned with the issue of producing lasting cognitive and behavioral change. Selecting a particular value as the target value and changing its importance in the chosen direction is ethically permissible if, in the judgment of at least a majority of a reviewing committee, is compatible with the basic assumptions of a democratic society and, even more important in the interest of all humanity. On the basis of both of these criteria, research intended to induce decreases in such values as freedom, equality, a world at peace, or a world of beauty would not be ethically permissible (Rokeach, 1973; 1979).

Conclusion

Rokeach's investigations show that terminal and instrumental values are important to many aspects of daily life. Education is one powerful means of influencing

values, instruction in values is central to the educational task, change in values is probable based on criteria which can be effected by educational methods, and major ethical considerations are involved in such educational activities. His approach, using the 18 terminal values and cross-cultural studies indicate that his findings apply to many human situations, both for individuals and cultures.

C. Intuition Based Approaches

Introduction

The third position concerning values in curriculum theory is that of absolute values based on common human intuition. This position is typified by the research of John Rawls. He has contributed to literature in education, political science and philosophy. Thousands of articles have been written about his ideas. This section will present his main ideas, in the context of their use in educational theory.

Modern philosophical discussions of democratic and other educational values focus for the greater part on pragmatic or utilitarian positions. Such positions are called `teleological' which implies that the goal or end of the system is a value which is chosen by the person or persons holding the system. In other words, the ethical value held is being brought into the classroom and the actual educational practice occurs, in good measure, to bring the value to be more prominent or more practiced in daily life. Cranor (1984) shows fourteen positions within the range of pragmatic approaches.

Other approaches are termed deontological (Johnson, 1980). These include a variety of realist and idealist positions in educational philosophy and curriculum theory. The idea of a deontological ethic is that the value is an end in itself, not a means to another end. This use of terms parallels Rokeach's terminal (deontological) values in

part. This is the type of system Rawls has developed.

One modification also found in the literature, is a realist value position. This is one form of a deontological position which implies that the end is given through or by the nature of reality, either by natural law or by some higher being. It differs from other deontological positions in that it holds that the "good" is an absolute for all people and societies. Peters (1979), Putnam (1987) and Adler (1989) developed a form of realism which seeks middle ground with pragmatism.

1. Rawls' Position

One modern position tries to blend pragmatist and deontological realist grounds for values. This was designed by John Rawls, a political philosopher at Harvard. In spite of many similarities with teleological systems, Rawls argues that the good identified by his system is not teleological, i.e., not chosen for a higher good or social benefit (1971, pp. 90-95), but that the practice of such an ethical position makes use of teleological methods.

Rawls (1971) bases his system of value on four ideas (pp. 11-16). First, he says that all valuing, to be fair, should begin in the common position of reflective equilibrium (pp. 17-21; 118-183). This orientation puts a thinker in a mental state in which he does not remember the personal circumstances of his life. Thus, he is free to decide and will that which is just or fair in each situation, without personal bias. In this position all people are treated as equal since it is not clear who might benefit beyond the scope of the ethical issue presented.

Second, one should act so that the action could be willed to be common human action (pp. 75-89). This entails the first formal principle: each person is to have an

equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others (p. 60). This principle maximizes the amount of freedom for each individual, which is already a value choice. If one approaches this position from a personal perspective then the formulation appears teleological in that the perspective is one's own and is based on one's ideas, not some external standard.

The problem with holding this as a full teleological position is twofold. First, a person's perspective is formed from something; that is, experience, genetics, nature or something is involved in coming to the positions we hold. There are reasons why people hold values. The assumption of the original position is that present personal factors should be eliminated as introducing possible bias and leading to a less than just conclusion.. But Rawls does not assume that we forget all aspects of life. No line is clear as to what constitutes personal versus social relevance. Second, Rawls' description of the functioning of the original position leads to a reconciliation of values and courses of action. It leads to a unitary value which all the members of the original position would accept as representing the correct common position. If this is true then there is a state of affairs which is the most just and represents common human intuition and reason. If this is so, and if all people could find this just decision within the original position, then anyone could find it in real life. If this is so, then the original position is not needed, only fairness in decision making.

The third major component in Rawls system (1971) is that social and economic inequalities (usually benefits) are to be arranged so that they are both reasonable, i.e., expected to be to everyone's advantage, and attached to positions and offices open to all (p. 60). This fairness in economic inequalities is modified by the difference principle

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(pp. 76-80) and by the principle that all values should be modified to call for action to protect those who cannot protect themselves (usually harms) (pp. 65-69). This point leads to specific political and social principles and actions well beyond the scope of education. But seeing the educational process as a form of social involvement which is certainly affected by political decisions leaves room for discussion and application. Rawls does not make such applications.

Fourth, within the framework above, all rules should maximize freedom (pp. 83-90). This really is a deontological value which Rawls chooses; it is implicit in the first formal principle, under the discussion of his second systematic principle above. He offers a rationale for this value based on the historic documents of the United States and on the natural drive toward personal freedom of thought and action which he believes is common to all human beings. This historic basis is used by other value theorists, apart from the naturalist point.

With these four ideas in place Rawls proceeds to design a rather complete approach to values based on the universal understanding of people in an ethically balanced position.

Rawls theory is not offered as a description of ordinary meanings but as an account of certain distributive principles for the basic structure of society. Rawls (1971, p. 3) says, "My aim is to present a conception of justice which centralizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant." In order to do this, we are not to think of the original contract as one to begin a particular society or to set up a particular form of government. Rather, the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic

structure of society are the object of an original agreement given in the nature of voluntary society.

Rawls maintains this approach even though he realizes that no society has been fully constructed by these principles. They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association. "These principles are to regulate all further agreements. This way of reading, the principles of justice I shall call justice as fairness" (1971, p. 4).

Thus, those who engage in social cooperation, choose together, in one joint act, the principles which are to assign basic rights and duties and are to determine the division of social benefits. People are to decide in advance how they are to regulate their claims against one another and what is to be the foundation of their society. Just as each person must decide by rational reflection what constitutes the good, that is, the system of ends which it is rational to pursue, so a group of persons in the original position must decide once and for all what is to count among them as just and unjust. The choice which rational men would make in this hypothetical situation of equal liberty determines, or reveals, the principles of justice.

The contrast approach to Rawls is to conceive the basis of society as coming purely from a social contract, without the agreement coming from or implying any fundamental value. Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* and Rousseau's *The Social Contract,* are definitive of the contract tradition.   Kant's ethical works beginning with The *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* represents a deontological position somewhat like Rawls.

Rawls wants to ensure that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since all people are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.

Rawls' says, "For, given the circumstances of the original position, the symmetry of everyone's relations to each other, this initial situation is fair between individuals as moral persons, that is, as rational beings with their own ends and capable, I shall assume, of a sense of justice." (1971, p. 12).

Rawls admits that more than one actual society might be accurate representations of the unitive principles of this intuitive position. "Moreover, assuming that the original position does determine a set of principles (that is, that a particular conception of justice would be chosen), it will then be true that whenever social institutions satisfy these principles those engaged in them can say to one another that they are cooperating on terms to which they would agree if they were free and equal persons whose relations with respect to one another were fair." (1971, p. 13). It is also true that no existing society may fulfill this goal.

The concern is that an actual society should satisfy the principles of justice as fairness, as close as a society can come while being a voluntary scheme(cf. the discussion by Likona, 1991 and Wilson, 1993). Such a society would be an instantiation of Rawls' principles, for it meets the principles which free and equal persons would assent to under circumstances that are fair.

2. Criticisms of Rawls

The basis for decision making which Rawls posits has often been criticized. He uses a variety of modern rationality based on standards within economic theory, which in turn are based on philosophic and mathematical logic. "Moreover, the concept of rationality must be interpreted as far as possible in the narrow sense, standard in economic theory, of taking the most effective means to given ends." (p. 13).

This choice leaves Rawls open to charges of having been biased by his own Western way of thinking.

Rawls believes that the persons in the initial situation would choose two principles: the first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example, inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.(1971, pp. 13-14).

More significant criticism is aimed at Rawls' position by Goldman (1995). Goldman is concerned for the situation which is not represented by the majority or by normal circumstances of a society. Would fairness extend to all the members of a society? Rawls argues that there is no injustice in the greater benefits earned by a few provided that the situation of persons not so fortunate is thereby improved. "The intuitive idea is that since everyone's well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life, the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing cooperation of everyone taking part in it, including those less well situated." (Goldman, 1995).

Goldman's argument can be modified and extended in this way. For the relevant circumstances of each member of a society to be represented in a group of moral

decision makers within a veil of ignorance, one or more of the members of the group must have personal knowledge of the conditions of society.

Rawls faces a dilemma here. If any member knows the circumstances of specific members of society and other members of the group do not know these circumstances then all the members must modify the decisions of the group based on the asserted knowledge claim of one member. If all the members are said to have knowledge of all the circumstances, then no group is necessary; only one person who thinks fairly is needed. Rawls position leads to either a claim for universal knowledge of circumstances, which is unreasonable, or to fairness as the rational heritage of every moral decision maker, which is close to Kohlberg's position. Justification of choices becomes unworkable or reduces to simple rational moral theory. Rawls acknowledges this: "justification is settled by working out a problem of deliberation: we have to ascertain which principles it would be rational to adopt given the contractual situation. This connects the theory of justice with the theory of rational choice."(1985). But Rawls does not see that this not only connects with the theory of rational choice, which he has rejected, it further reduces his position to a rational choice position and compromises his entire argument. If common rationality settles all deliberative problems, then his whole theory is a form of rational choice theory, with a unique starting point.

Rawls is trying to avoid two other problems. He does not wish to develop a position based on a deontological rational deduction, that is, he thinks that a conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles. Rather, he wants a position in which actual circumstances are judged with rational and moral fairness. "Instead, its justification is a matter of the mutual support of many

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considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view." (1971, p. 51).

Here the use of the word `coherence' shows the conflict which Rawls has.

Coherence is the philosophical name for a test of truth based on reason, or rationality. This is an inappropriate test for Rawls' non-deductive system. The other major candidate for an epistemological test is correspondence, which judges the "fit" between a theory or assertion and a state of affairs in the real world (Walker, 1987; Whitehead, 1987). If a principle is coherent with a system it does not contradict the system. If a principle is correspondent with a state of affairs then it is a valid statement. Rawls endorses the correspondence view.

Rawls takes the weaker form of the rational position which does not include a deductive test but rather a simple test of common rationality. The inability to use a strong form of coherence seems to be a weakness in Rawls' position.

When the basic two principles are in place and the deliberation of the original position is conducted under the guidelines of simple coherence, the remaining choices are left to individuals in the actual situations to be worked out. This is in accord with the freedom principle.   "Once these principles are satisfied, other inequalities are allowed to arise from men's voluntary actions in accordance with the principle of free association. (1971, p. 95)" In this way Rawls maximizes freedom of action and thought, accepting minor inequalities.

Rawls also deals with the theme or subject matter of justice, which is foundational for the principles to be developed as a system of thought and action. "The primary subject of justice, as I have emphasized, is the basic structure of society. (1971, p. 96)" Rawls reason for this is that societies' effects are so profound and pervasive,

being present from birth. This starting point for developing a system raises many questions. It seems to assume that all cultures functionally are unified within a society. It assumes that the basic value of justice is the foundational value for all people in all societies. It ignores other claimants to being foundational values.

His reason for choosing this starting point is defended, "This structure favors some starting places over others in the division of the benefits of social cooperation. It is these inequalities which the two principles are to regulate."(1971, p. 96) Rawls begins, not with a defense of the primary value, but with the weakest point in his system: the existence of inequalities. The existence of inequalities is a problem for every ethical system. Rawls chooses the principles of justice, fairness and weak rationality because together they form a system he believes can be defended *in toto*.

> Now as far as possible the basic structure should be appraised from the position
> of equal citizenship. This position is defined by the rights and liberties required
> by the principle of equal liberty and the principle of fair equality of opportunity.
> When the two principles are satisfied, all are equal citizens, and so everyone
> holds this position. In this sense, equal citizenship defines a general point of
> view. The problems of adjudication among the fundamental liberties are settled
> by reference to it. (1971, p. 96).

This general point of view is his name for the decisions people would make if the original position functioned as he has construed it. One problem is that there is no original position. We have to live life with conflicting points of view, varying values, often opposing goals and personal conflicts. In accepting this criticism Rawls uses the principle of allowing minor inequalities as the price of making a "human" system work.

The use of Rawls' system in education is the basis for much of the value work done by the Values Clarification approach. In this approach a group of students is given a set of circumstances and asked to deliberate together to discern 1) who is at fault, if anyone, 2) what are the harms and benefits in the situation, 3) who benefits, and at whose expense, if any, and 4) what should be done to resolve the situation or what could have been done differently to change the outcome? The Value Clarification scenarios were used by teachers during the late 1970s and early 1980s across the United States. They have fallen into disuse, largely because there is no correct answer; that is, different groups of students did not come to similar conclusions, unless prompted (directed) by the teacher. This inability to see the "correct" decision arrived at by diverse groups undercut the idea that there is one solution to which all rational people would come.

Rawls' position, seen as a form of rational choice, is closely allied to many historic value positions within American thought. The following five points have occurred frequently:

1. belief in basic human rationality,

2. belief in the ability to work politically and economically for all people,

3. belief that social deliberation is a healthy form of decision making,

4. belief that freedom is a major value,

5. belief that those who are less advantaged should be protected as part of the system.

The resulting discussion revolves around the best way to bring these values together to form a systematic whole.

Democratic theorists (Dewey, 1916, 1946; Burbules, 1990, 1995, 1996; Butts, 1988, 1989; Garrison, 1994, 1996; Gutmann, 1990, 1996; Wynn, 1985, 1986) usually begin with an assumption that democratic principles have worked well in the world (a quasi-empirical starting point) and argue that such principles would work well for all people. In fact, there is far more intuition than empiricism in this position. The intuitive-democratic position is a variation on the intuitive position of Rawls. The theorists focus on common interests for people today, but using Greek or early American democratic values. They focus on common interest and historic continuity, at least within the U. S. model. Reference to contemporary cases is to evaluate how the principles of democracy are working, thus contemporary reference is a test grounds for the continuing reliability of democratic values. Rawls and Burbules represent two such intuitive systems.

D. Cultural Approaches

The fourth position is different from the others in that it does not reflect any one position but is a meta-position, holding that no one set of values is determinative. The cultural position allows each human culture to develop its own values and to transmit its own values to the children in the culture (Bower, 1987; Collins, 1987; Giroux, 1987B; Popkewitz, 1988; Spiecker, and Straughan, 1988; Taylor, 1992).

 This position does not seek to identify transcendental values via development, social analysis or intuition. It does not project finding beyond the actual group under study. Yet this position is becoming popular today as the foundation for the new cultural acceptance of the "mixing bowl" position. The major proponent for this position is Aaron Wildavsky, who does not write in education but in political science.

In his article, "Choosing preferences by constructing institutions: a cultural theory of preference formation," Wildavsky (1987) says that preferences come from living with other people (p. 3). This could be called a dynamic social relativism. Wildavsky prefers calling it a cultural approach without making further philosophical assignments.

These preferences are loosely formalized in three levels (reminiscent of Krathwold, 1964):

first level choices - interests (4)

second level choices - preferences (social relational choices) (4)

third level choices - policies (4)

Individuals make decisions which are accepted or rejected by peers and this gives support for and opposition to different ways of life (p. 5). This often happens in practice as children go through the process of socialization in early developmental years from 5-10 years of age.

But Wildavsky treats this decision acceptance or rejection as if it were the sole criteria for adoption of a way of life by a person. Many other factors are involved in such personal development of a way of life, such as relation to parents and significant others, response to rules in school, home, church and other social institutions, and by persistence of behavior in spite of social rejection. The latter case, persistence, may account not only for social deviance but also for the formation of new trends and fads.

Wildavsky is correct that the shared value legitimating social relations (4) may lead to social groups and perpetuation of a way of life. But this does not account for all factors in social cohesion and social growth.

Wildavsky says that people make decisions for or against authority (5) and that

people construct culture and values (5). This points to a more individuated basis for social development than social conformity. It is true that shared social life (culture) is more powerful tool than heuristics or ideologies (3). Teaching principles or ethics is not appropriate in years before rational reflection is usual (before age 10-12). Yet it is in these very years, 5-10, that socialization takes place.

In spite of these potential problems it is useful to examine Wildavsky's matrix of model cultures.

Figure 1. Model of Four cultures (p. 6)

Strength of Group Boundaries

	Weak	Strong
Numerous	Apathy	Hierarchy
	"Fatalism"	"Collectivism"
Number and Variety of Prescriptions	Competition	Equality
Few	"Individualism"	"Egalitarianism"

Wildavsky says that conflict among these cultures is necessary for cultural identity (p. 7), because it is only in the presence of an alternative way of life that the child is made aware of his own prejudice or bias and has the opportunity to select the one and reject the other, thus confirming a way of life. Under the impact of social rejections, the further the distance between reality and the ideal maintained by the social group, the greater the desire for rapid and radical change in most children (p. 12).

Wildavsky renames the metaethical decisions as "master preferences," which includes the questions: How do I define myself? What group do I identify with? He

explains (p. 8) most value variation within a cultural group as small variations in answering these questions. Most children do not ever raise these questions consciously.

One of the factors which is not accounted for in this model explicitly is given further discussion by Wildavsky (p. 18). How people organize their institutions has a powerful effect on their preferences. In education this point is related to the discussion of the "hidden curriculum," the fact that the social institution of the school is presented to the student with built in economic, social, governance and behavioral structures. These structures can be taken as either part of the social situation within which the student is socialized, or as an outside influence on the peer socialization which goes on in the developmental period.

Wildavsky says (p. 6) that once a student begins to identify with one group set of behaviors and values, each act is accepted as culturally rational if it supports one's way of life. Thus, the warrant for choice is peer acceptance or modeling and this choice often results in the strengthening of group boundaries.

Wildavsky does not speculate on the philosophical implications, implications for educational theory, or philosophical progenitors of his position. He examines only the social and economic actions. But the conclusions he draws are compatible with the current metaphor of American life as a mixing bowl, rather than the older metaphor of a melting pot. However, mere compatility is not sufficient for showing an analytic relationship between these two positions. Thus, there is no broader theoretical position for Wildavsky's cultural approach to social development.

Thompson, Ellis, Wildavsky (1990) revise and extend the earlier work of

Wildavsky (1987) in establishing a new approach to understanding the relation between various value positions in political science and make extensions to the field of education. Their name for this new position is cultural theories of values. In their book the authors attempt to learn from the different communities of value which exist and to begin to theorize about how these communities can be drawn together into a national sense of a cohesive position on values.

Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky distinguish three terms - cultural biases, social relations, and ways of life. "Cultural bias refers to shared values and beliefs. Social *relations* are defined as patterns of interpersonal relations. When we wish to designate a viable combination of social relations and cultural bias we speak of a way of life." (p. 1). Priority, in their conception, is given neither to cultural bias nor to social relations. Rather each is essential to the other. Relations and biases are reciprocal, interacting, and mutually reinforcing.

The viability of a way of life depends upon a mutually supportive relationship between a particular cultural bias and a particular pattern of social relations. They indicate (p. 2) that these biases and relations cannot be mixed and matched. A change in the way an individual perceives physical or human nature, for instance, changes the range of behavior an individual can justify engaging in and hence the type of social relations an individual can live in. Shared values and beliefs are thus not free to come together in any which way; they are always closely tied to the social relations they help legitimate. This is an anticipation of the definition of and use of warrants for theory justification.

Thus, the justification of values and the justification of social relations follow a

similar pattern. In curriculum theory this relation between justification of values and social patterns is parallel to the justification of value choices described in chapter one above.

Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky take this one step further. A theory combining values and social relations needs to be applied by actual individuals in actual social relations. Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky call this actual lived combination a way of life. (p. 2). A way of life will remain viable only if it inculcates in its constituent individuals the cultural values that justifies it. Conversely, individuals, if they wish to make a way of life for themselves, must negotiate a set of values and beliefs capable of supporting that way of life. The way of life does not always inculcate the pattern of justification of values. But the values themselves must be adopted and followed.

The need to explain the preferences and perceptions of individuals opens up the need for a functional mode of explanation (Rainer, 1987; Kirk, 1989; Boss, 1994). Functional analysis directs attention to the social restrictions that hedge in the individual and thereby bolster a particular set of social institutions. Ways of life are made viable by classifying certain behaviors as worthy of praise and others as undesirable, or even unthinkable. Although it is individuals who construct, bolster, contest, and discredit ways of life, from the standpoint of any single individual, the social world appears largely as a given.

While Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (p. 3) insist that ways of life channel the thought and behavior of individuals, they agree that functionalism too often fails to acknowledge that many times an individual knows a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member. The extent to which

individuals are aware of providing support to their way of life depends on their level of cultural consciousness.

Supplementing the claim that the viability of ways of life is constrained by the need for congruence between social relations and cultural values is a second, more ambitious, claim: Five and only five ways of life -- hierarchy, egalitarianism, fatalism, individualism, and autonomy -- meet these conditions of viability (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, p. 3). They contend that whatever their singular merits may be, the great social theorists of the past rarely went beyond the development from hierarchy to individualism, thereby leaving out fatalism, egalitarianism, and autonomy.

Introducing more than two modes of organizing social life makes social change both more difficult and more interesting to explain. Older theorists often attempted to account for socialization using one comprehensive theory. More recent works in the second half of the twentieth century use bipolar models. If there are just two ways of life, being dislodged from one necessarily means landing in the other. Allowing for changes between five ways of life produces a more powerful and discriminating theory of change.

Change occurs because the five ways of life, though viable, are not entirely impervious to the real world. That human perception is everywhere constructed by cultural value choice does not mean that people can make the world come out any way they wish. "Surprise" - the discrepancy between the expected and the actual - is of central importance in dislodging individuals from their way of life. Change occurs when successive events intervene in such a manner as to prevent a way of life from delivering on the expectations it has generated, thereby prompting individuals to seek more

promising alternatives (p. 4).

At the same time that the five ways of life are in competition for adherents, so too are they dependent on one another. Each way of life needs each of its rivals, either to make up for its deficiencies, or to exploit, or to define itself against. To destroy the other is to murder the self. Were egalitarians to eliminate hierarchists and individualists, for instance, their lack of a target to be against would remove the justification for their strong group boundary and thus undermine their way of life. Or, to take another example, were individualists ever to rid the world of hierarchy, there would be no extra-market authority to enforce the laws of contract, thus producing the breakdown of the individualists' way of life. "If each way of life depends upon each of the rival ways of life for survival, then it follows that for one way of life to exist there must be at least five ways of life in existence. This we refer to as the requisite variety condition, that is, there may be more than five ways of life, but there cannot be fewer" (p. 5).

This insistence on five as a minimum cannot be sustained without showing one of two situations to be the case. Either each one is necessary to the existence of the others, which they have not shown, or in actual fact there are five and they are in mutual dependence, which they also have not shown. In theory alone, they have not shown the necessity of exactly five, or more, ways of life. For example, Mitchell (1989) argues that there are four such ways of life and that at least three forms are necessary for cultural change. The stipulation of five is further weakened by the elimination of one choice, autonomy, by Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (p. 99) in their discussion of change within social relations.

Specific cultures, in this conception, are as varied as nations, ethnic groups,

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companies, clubs, any and all collections of people that think a bit differently, employ

somewhat different signs, or whose customary practices and/or artifacts have

something special about them. French culture is different from British culture is different

from American culture; the corporate culture of Audi is different from Ford is different

from Toyota; Presbyterian culture is different from Quaker culture is different from

Baptist culture; and so on. (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, p. 4)

Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky attempt to show that although nations and

neighborhoods, tribes and races, have their distinctive sets of values, beliefs, and

habits, their basic convictions about life are reducible to only a few cultural biases. By

limiting the number of viable ways of life one can rescue the study of culture from the

practitioners of ethnography who conceive of culture solely as small group ways of life.

Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky's theory has a specific point of departure: the

grid-group typology proposed by Mary Douglas (1982). She argues that the variability

of an individual's involvement in social life can be adequately captured by two

dimensions of sociality: group and grid. "Group" refers to the extent to which an

individual is incorporated into bounded units. The greater the incorporation, the more

individual choice is subject to group determination. "Grid" denotes the degree to which

an individual's life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions. The more

binding and extensive the scope of the prescriptions, the less of life that is open to

individual negotiation.

The group dimension, Douglas explains, taps the extent to which "the individual's

life is absorbed in and sustained by group membership." A person who joined with

others in "common residence, shared work, shared resources and recreation" would be

assigned a high group rating. The further one moves along the group dimension, "the tighter the control over admission into the group and the higher the boundaries separating members from nonmembers."

The starting point for making choices is the same for all humans and was identified by Krathwold (1964) in his taxonomy of the affective domain. Pleasure leads to preference, preference leads to active choice, choice leads to building habits of choice, and habits lead to the formation of a character. This level of personal development of affective values is not discussed by Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky but it is a useful complement for the present work on developing a matrix.

Cultural theory, according to Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, sees each way of life in dynamic contradistinction to the others. Including some people inevitably entails excluding other people. Those who are individualized are not all individualized in the same way. Those individuals who are successful in building extensive personal networks, for instance, will inevitably be preventing those who find themselves toward the peripheries of these networks from doing the same. Nor are those who are collectivized all collectivized in the same way. Those groups that manage to arrange themselves into networks of groups (by establishing ranked and ordered relationship with one another) will inevitably diverge from those groups that (having opted to maximize transactions by ensuring that every member is personally related to every other member) define themselves by their fervent rejection of established inequality.

The cultural theory of Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky gives an overall picture of a self-organizing system in which transactions are being maximized without at the same time destroying the cognitive means by which those who are busy organizing

themselves this way or that are able to experience, and hence promote, their different ways of organizing. This system focuses on collective behavior and contemporary forms of change and therefore of social interest (Kahle, 1983; Gardner, 1991). It uses competition at the personal level of integration and a dialectical process at a social level (Nicholls, 1989).

If preferences occurred only in individuals, there would have to be a separate explanation for each individual. Social science and education, not to mention society, would be impossible. Fortunately preferences are never just randomly assembled; they are patterned, both within and between individuals. Choosing what to want is not like ordering a la carte, but rather is more like ordering from a small number of set dinners. "The task for the social scientist is to describe and explain this patterning of preferences. Whereas explanation in terms of personalities makes analysis too chaotic, explanation in terms of large aggregates (such as societies, tribes, or classes) cannot account for the significant variety that we observe within those sorts of entities." (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, p. 57)

Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (p. 57) conclude that: "The theory of sociocultural viability, which conceives of the individual as constrained by the social relations that form him, and of societies as constituted by ways of life, provides the long-sought-after middle way between too diverse individuals and too uniform societies."

A theory of a way of life, using Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky's broad term, gives a context to the levels described by a taxonomy or a matrix and the levels are descriptive of the sets of actions of the individuals who make up the theory generalization. When a taxonomy is embedded in a theory then the taxonomy

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becomes predictive of the kinds of behavior being measured as to their future occurrence.

A theory needs to be internally consistent (the justifying test of consistency) and externally effective (the test of relational correspondence). Relevant competing macro theories are the best explanations of events which are available to people.

Cultural theory gives explanations of divergent activity seen in macro terms (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, p. 271). But integration will not occur until competing ways of life show themselves to be inadequate to new circumstances or until the rationale for a way of life is exposed as flawed. This type of change demands either the failure of the taxonomy or a new way of looking at life which makes better sense of the phenomena (a paradigm shift) (Kuhn, 1970; Sarason, 1982).

Questions still remain for the system developed by Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky. Are values really constrained in practice by institutional relationships, or are people more free to adjust and act using forms of action which do not arise from within their social group (Corder and Baumlin, 1988)? Is the union of values and social relations really the dynamic set of elements which give rise to ways of life (Mitchell, 1989)? Cannot integration and learning take place across cultural patterns (Berger, 1987; Buchannan, 1987)? Don't both trends and fads point to more dynamic activity than this theory suggests? Does not the national values theory research of Rokeach show that the divergence in cultural values is across the hierarchy of values, not the divergence in actual values arising from social interactions?

It is now time to pull the relevant parts of this discussion of the four positions into a matrix for educational value theorists.

Chapter III. Constructing a Matrix for Assessing Values

Once appropriately relevant theorists have been identified (chapter two) within a taxonomy, there is still a need to find a basis to evaluate the taxonomies concerning which one will best serve the needs of a particular educator or system of education. To compare these taxonomies, a rational choice matrix and a standard model of assessment must be developed.

A. Developing a rational choice matrix

Thompson and his colleagues (1990) make a comparative association of relevant value theories from a relativistic position, but they do not align the value labels based on the value terms (they use social data), they do not try to incorporate or evaluate other positions, and they do not construct a matrix.

In fact no matrix exists for cross-comparison of the four existing models. Such a matrix is derivable from two strands of research: analysis of the components of the taxonomies from chapter two, and ideas in Turner (1991) on making rational choices between various approaches to building theories in the field of sociology.

Turner's (1991) suggestion is that there are common topics among various sociological perspectives and that a matrix can be developed using these common elements (chapter one of Turner, 1991). Turner lays the groundwork for a comparison in his research on comparative sociological theories, although he does not construct a matrix of sociological theories.

Such a matrix, in education, will need to evaluate fairly all the educational value models (identified in chapter two) and make use of warrants (measures of personal/social meaningfulness identified in chapters one and two) which relate to all

the models.

In constructing a values matrix for evaluating the taxonomies (systems of values), two goals will be pursued in this chapter: 1) identify the types of values in each of the taxonomies; 2) discern a pattern of value description that makes sense of the situation within each of the models and evaluate critically the arguments regarding values and value bases being used by the theorists under scrutiny.

B. Types of Values in a Taxonomy

In order to identify the types of values in each of the taxonomies a system of relating values to each other is needed. This system cannot be empirical, since this would reduce to Rokeach's empirically based research and conclusions. The system cannot be based on social consensus at local levels for that is Wildavsky's system and leaves no basis for agreement across systems. The system cannot be based on intuition or this would be something like Rawls' original position. Thus, the approach to identify types cannot be based on a single methodology.

There is no hypothetical-speculative systematic approach which may be used, since this would imply either that one of the ethical philosophers was correct and that there is some basis for rationally affirming that particular conclusion, or that human reason itself is the test of truth and that there is one rational derivable conclusion to which all humans should come eventually.

If a system of related values cannot be based on empiricism, social consensus, intuition, or reason, there would not appear to be a basis for construction of the system within the typical categories and terms of educational theory.

However, I suggest that the four taxonomies of chapter two, representing the four

methods of investigation indicated in chapter one, may stand as themselves the unordered system of human values extant in the literature of educational theory today. This leads to the methods of investigation being the methods of constructing values based on the methodological approach of each taxonomy. The test of the system would be the tests or warrants presented in chapter one, especially the test of coherence.

The values which are of interest within all four taxonomies, and which constitute a ground for cross-examination of the four taxonomies, are:

interest in historic continuity,

interest in contemporary reference,

interest in individual freedoms,

interest in promoting the common good.

Not all value theorists would share these four common values in the same way or with the same weight within each system.

The anticipated X factors on a matrix chart would be the orientation of *historic continuity* vs *contemporary reference* direction in the theories, and the Y factors would be the philosophical choices of *individual freedom* vs *common interest* as primary values. Since all Americans are interested in all four of these values, it seems reasonable that all four would be of interest academically and that differences of position would be based on the relative weight each value is given in the system.   Such a new matrix would be as follows:

Chart II: Elements of a Value Matrix of Education

	historic continuity	contemporary reference
individual freedom		
common interest		

By examining the authors and positions described in chapter two the following authors can be assigned to respective placement on the matrix in light of their value positions:

Chart III: The Values Matrix

	historic continuity	contemporary reference
individual freedom	Kohlberg	Rawls; Rokeach
common interest	Burbules	Wildavsky

This matrix represents a new paradigm, which will allow a new depth of analysis. As such, it is a starting point for assessing the four taxonomies. The taxonomies must be further analyzed to determine: 1) the relative weights assigned to these possible variables; and 2) what the implications are for curriculum theories.

C. Evaluating Theorists in the Matrix

How may theories be evaluated relative to one another? Turner's example shows the relative positioning of empirical and theoretical issues in a chart (1991, p. 8), which is reproduced here:

Chart IV: Turner's Analysis of Theories

				Meta-theoretical schemes
				Analytical schemes
Definitions	Concepts	Statements	Formats	Propositional schemes
				Modeling schemes

Statements are the way that concepts take specific shape in the language. It is at the

level of statements that empirical data influence the way that concepts are formed in

language. After showing the role of the various terms of this chart and how the

statements take the format of one of the schemes, Turner shows how these theoretical

elements are related by level of abstraction (Turner, 1991, p. 21).

Chart V: Turner's Levels of Theory

	Axiomatic/ formal	Analytical schemes	Meta- theory
High		Analytic models	
Level of Abstraction	Middle-range propositions		
Low	Empirical generalization	Causal model	

Low   High
Scope of substantive phenomena

What distinguishes between various elements of schemes (theory statements) is their

scope; the range of phenomena covered by the statement (Turner, 1991, p. 21). Useful

theories must be abstract to apply to many cases of particulars. But such theories must

also be testable in some means in order to be affirmed or rejected. Turner (1991, p. 24) thinks that all three forms of high levels of abstraction are too general to generate good, testable theories. He also thinks that mid-range propositions are possibly too narrow in scope to serve as good theories. Some form of axiomatic propositions or analytic models are the place to build testable theories (1991, pp. 25-26).

This discussion of the appropriate level of abstraction in theory construction is ongoing. Taylor (1993) and Weiler (1996) both raise the question of whether the politico-educational theories of Paulo Freire are presented in so abstract a form as to be not useful in describing any concrete situations. If a theory is presented in an overly abstract way, it is neither predictive nor testable. If a theory is too narrow, that is based on specific empirical results without sufficient generalization, it does not generate a system of understanding which is inclusive and comprehensive.

Turner's solution is to use axiomatic propositions or analytic models. The danger, which he does not discuss, is that one may loose touch with the facticity of the mid-range propositions. The building blocks of a theory must originate in the empirical level of investigation, be linked together in an explanatory system or causal model, be generalized in the form of middle-range propositions and be theoretically linked together to form analytic models. Only when the links of such a scheme (system) are seen does the model retain the connection to empirical data and thus preserve empirical integrity.

However, it is possible to go beyond Turner and use even less advanced levels of abstraction to form a theoretical means for analysis and integration of a system. This can be accomplished by relating middle-range propositions to one another in a hypothetical analytic model, and then testing the relationships of the theory to discern if

the analytic model is faithful to the propositions; a test of coherence (see discussion in chapter one). Some form of analytic model, made up of middle range propositions, based on empirical generalizations is necessary to be sufficiently broad in scope and yet testable in practice. This new formal understanding of statements and the levels of abstraction and scope of phenomena can be applied to the theoretical matrix of relational elements of values in education and will serve as one of the foundations for assessing the matrix in this chapter, and for evaluating the value models in chapter four.

D. Pattern of Value Descriptions: Elements of a Matrix Applied

All four of the models of values exhibit relations of theoretical statements (the conclusions drawn) to actual individuals (the persons studied), thus the positions are capable of analysis in the terms of the new analysis model above, defined for both specificity and generalizability in constructing theories.

Kohlberg focuses on the developmental process of each individual, which are presented as sharing in similar stages of development, and the ability of the individual to make moral decisions at various levels. In terms of the matrix, Kohlberg is using individual freedom and historic continuity. The possibility of contemporary life and thought being so different as to be the major factor in moral theory is not even presented by Kohlberg.

The statements reflecting moral decision making in Kohlberg's stages are related to actual states of affairs in the world faced by individuals. This corresponds to empirical generalizations. That these moral decisions must be made by all people raises the issue to middle range propositions. Thus Kohlberg's theory, which embraces the middle range propositions, is one step higher, namely, an analytic model.

Similarly, in the empirical model of Rokeach, the values identified are the actual values of individuals which they hold as terminal values. Rokeach also focuses on individual decisions. But Rokeach does not extrapolate to say that all humans progress through a values decision process in the same way. In fact, he shows that while individuals in different cultures do hold many of the same values, they rank order the values differently and thus come to different value conclusions. Therefore, Rokeach focuses on individual freedom and contemporary reference.

Rokeach's theory is given in terms of specific words which have meaning to individuals in actual experience. This part of the theory is based on empirical research and generalizations. The collection of the set of values and testing of the set across various audiences may be seen as functioning at the level of analytic models. Rokeach does not really present and defend the larger model, which would have made the transition between empirical generalizations and middle range propositions more clear. It is clear from the empirical testing he does within various cultural groups that the content of the terminal values are at least similar for various cultures.

In the intuitive model Rawls concludes that all individuals, by virtue of being human, would make the same moral decisions regarding any one set of circumstances from the original position, within the veil of ignorance. The influence of the corporate aspect of human nature are masked by the setting of the original position and the assumption is that all individuals would make the same or similar decisions. Rawls does not attempt to apply his theory to past generations or to a distant future. His focus in on the individual in a contemporary field of reference. Thus he focuses on individual freedom and contemporary reference, similar to Rokeach.

Rawls begins with an axiomatic formal scheme and relates it to specific analytic models of rules which govern behavior. He then tests the resultant specific rules of behavior by means of common sense and reason in hypothetical cases, based on the original position. He does not make use of empirical testing or empirical generalizations. But his terms of reference and conceptual outline is within the range of meanings in the new assessment model.

Burbles' position is articulated in a few articles and limited books. But his position, a variant of Rawls', is representative of many writers (Dewey, 1943; Peters, 1979; Gutmann, 1987; Wynn, 1986, 1988) who believe that the unique political values of democracy give rise to desirable moral values. The influence of democratic values on the group and the influence of the group on individuals is highlighted. The focus is on actual democratic experience in the modern era, but Burbules grounds the discussion in the early democratic values of ancient Greece (Burbules, 1989). Thus the focus is on the values of common interest to the set of members in a democracy and historic continuity with democratic thinking throughout human history.

This intuitive-democratic model begins with a generalization based on historic experience, that human existence is best served by the principles of democracy (rather than tyranny, relativity, communism or some other analytic or metaphysical scheme). This is almost an analytic model in Turner's terms (1991). The test of this scheme is usually a statement of empirical generalization that in some way human beings are better served in experience by the values of democracy than they are by other values. Some of the writers within the democracy group argue for specific middle range propositions or sets of propositions which form analytic models (sets of coherent

principles of democracy), e.g., Gutmann, 1990, as tests of the scheme. It is possible to see this position as relating an analytic model to middle range propositions.

Wildavsky (representative of himself, 1987, and Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1991) is concerned about the relation of various groups and sub-cultures within a broader culture. The focus in on the cultural group within a modern setting. The major values in terms of the matrix would be common interests of sub-cultures and contemporary reference.

This model begins with generalizations about common human experience within a sub-cultural group. These are empirical generalizations. But the theorists also assume, rather than argue, that all people are best served by a plurality of cultures and greater variety of cultural values. They even assert that at least four or five positions (depending on how one classifies hermits) are necessary for full development of human potential. This is really an analytic scheme, and is not based on individual or common experience. Thus Wildavsky's form of pluralism is a hybrid of empirical generalizations and an analytic scheme.

In summary, Kohlberg focuses on studies of the range of individual development which are true for all people in all cultures; therefore his focus can be characterized by the categories of study of the individual and links with historic continuity. Rokeach studies individuals within their cultures and their present value reference, not their historical development; thus his focus is on the individual and contemporary reference. Rawls is interested in common values and moral evaluations, but the means by which he does the analysis is through focusing on individuals and what they would do in the original position; thus he can be characterized by individual freedom and contemporary

reference.   Wildavsky's interest is in common interests within a cultural group and how such groups can be related to each other within the modern scene. His focus can be characterized by common interest and contemporary reference. These results validate the assignment of value theorists, representing the assigned model, to positions in Chart III, both in the types of values and in the pattern of the value descriptions.

Chapter IV. Application of the Values Matrix to The Four Taxonomies

The goal of this chapter is to assess each of the identified value positions (chapter two) as to its worth as a value position for a comprehensive curriculum theory. This assessment will be based on the finding of chapter three regarding the four core values of the matrix, using the method of analysis adapted from Turner (1991).

It would be misleading to say that some of the values of the matrix are strong values of one of the positions and the other values of the matrix are lacking in some of the positions; because the values of the matrix came from the positions in the first place. What can be done is to examine the four models at a deeper level seeking to answer two questions posed in chapter one: which position has the most internal consistency; which position has the most balance in formulating a curriculum theory? The questions of consistency and balance occur in the context of modern ideas about the aims of education and the needs of the modern world (e.g., Thurow, 1992). Before seeking answers to the two questions, it is important to study the literature related to the elements of the matrix.

A. Recent discussions related to the elements of the matrix

In 1988-1989 a number of articles (unconnected to each other) asked the question: is it time for a new revolution in philosophy of education and curriculum

theory? Boyer (1988) asked if the current discussions were even asking the proper

questions. He focused on the need for value-laden questions. But his discussion, while

broad in its questions, did not dig into the values themselves. Waks (1988) asked

deeper questions about the philosophical contexts of questions about curriculum theory

and proposed three contextual issues: intellectual components of theory, institutional

components of theory, and ideological components of theory. The discussion focused

on the ideological questions, but Waks did not draw a conclusion. These articles

illustrated the need to reframe the theoretical questions of education into more value

oriented issues.

Shugart (1989) suggested that in the past there have been battles over the

nature of the values in the curriculum and that we can see patterns of revolution.

Usually these educational revolutions led to the ideas which 1) were most in keeping

with the modern spirit (new, forward looking) being adopted by a verbal minority who

either had political, economic or administrative power (e.g., the extended years of

schooling in response to the depression of the 1930s), or 2) occurred when the weight

of the marketplace of ideas swung to one position (e.g., Dewey).

Purpel (1989), moving beyond the rhetoric of critical theory and post-modernism,

pointed to the moral and spiritual crisis of modern education. This concern over the

need for self-renewal of the American educational system is not new. Abraham Lincoln

(1859) focused on the foundational values of American labor and government in

response to Marx's Communist Manifesto. In 1951 the Educational Policies

Commission of the NEA published a book titled *Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public

School*, suggesting that in the new schooling after World War II the focus should remain

on values because they are the foundation of a free and just society. Purpel believes that schooling has degenerated so far between 1951 and 1989 that nothing short of a revolution in terminology and theory would allow modern education to regain credibility and effectiveness (cf. Martin, 1987). He believes that a new model of values is needed.

Tripp (1989) took these points a step further by investigating the idea of a meta-curriculum, that is, a set of underlying values which form a philosophical basis for the ensuing discussion of specific values in the curriculum. Most of Tripp's article is a restatement of commonly understood ideas about philosophy of education. But his focus on the connection between meta-ethics and theoretical components parallels the ideas of Turner (1991) in sociology and many figures in modern ethical theory in the field of philosophy.

Four authors in 1989-1990 pointed to specific issues which are potentially revolutionary. Stewart (1989) discussed first amendment rights, public schooling, and community values. His contribution is in keeping with the discussion of Wildavsky (1987) and Timar and Kirp (1988) about the need for inclusion of broadly defined community values, both at the local level (culturally relevant to local groups and issues) and at a national level (first amendment rights).

He does not provide a solution to the problems identified by Wildavsky (1987) or Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990) which were discussed in chapter one. No book or article to date has shown how multi-cultural interests (usually local or ethnic) and national interests (societies or nations) can be balanced in a curriculum.

Butts (1989) specifically examined the state of the civic mission in educational reform literature. His article is in the ideological group of democratic value theorists

(Adler, Bennett, Bloom, Burbules, Dewey, Gardner, Gutmann, Goldberg, Peters, Power, Regier, Tyack, and Wynn). This group focuses on the values of democracy, as they are worked out in practice and is inclusive of the values of the individual person and the national identity. Butts' main contribution is to remind us that the civic issues (issues of interpersonal and national relations) are as important today as ever. This is a reinforcement of Stewart's (1989) argument.

In 1990 Strike (1990) examined the role of parents, the state and educators concluding that parents were the missing agents in the discussions today and that educational reform (based on any theoretical approach) will not be pervasive until parents, and the values of interest to them, are enlisted in the discussion and social power is brought to bear on reform. Bergem (1990) looked at the teacher's role as moral agent, representing local and national interests in the classroom. If the philosophical values are not widely held by parents and communicated by teachers, then any theory is simple a textbook exercise. Change demands widespread cohesion on the direction of the values to be built into the curriculum.

Many of these issues were brought into focus by Brandhorst (1990) who argued that economic and control models of 20th century education have failed, and that we need to define problems in terms of the social values of modern society. This argument reinforces the need for investigations of possible value bases for curriculum reform and for the issues to be redefined in terms of widely held values. Brandhorst concludes that if persons are equal under the law and this value is seen as of primary importance, then justice models (e.g., Rawls) are best because the arguments for caring (Noddings, 1996) apply to each person and do not focus attention on the needs for equality so

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much as on existential, personal realities. Such realities are very important, but cannot form the basis for a national curriculum theory. They are more appropriately included in teacher education as part of the concern for instructional methods and local policy issues.

Thurow, an economist, discussed (1992) the economic issues of the immediate future and the clear rivalry between the United States, Germany, and Japan. He argues that many of the solutions for continuing independence and growing interdependence will find success or failure based on decisions made about education and specifically concerning the values of the educational system. His chapter on the current state of education points to the many opportunities and the crucial nature of the decisions about values, but does not discuss current educational reform literature and does not suggest a formula for moving ahead.

Beyer and Liston (1992) continue the post-modernist discussion on the nature of teaching: discourse or moral action. They conclude that teachers ought to be agents of moral change but that the basis for which values to adopt and which agendas to follow have not been agreed upon and that curriculum theory and teacher education are both in difficult times. Fineberg (1993) and Harrison (1994) respond that what is needed is a new emphasis on democratic values, understood in the tradition of Dewey, but focused on modern discussions. They feel that such a balance of historical and contemporary reference will allow the ideological discussions to move forward toward a solution set relevant to U. S. society today (common interests).

Alexander (1992) discussed the balance of science and spirituality as value models for teacher education and curriculum theory. He believes, somewhat like Purpel

(1989), that modern education has over-emphasized scientific values; not that the values are wrong but that they have been abstracted from life issues, and that balance in curriculum development and development of the next generation demands an equal stress on the development of the human spirit and more humane values.

Donovan (1995) showed that as Plato moved from his early theory about education and the state in which he develops the theory of virtue, to his later theory of justice (The Republic), so must modern education include elements of character development but must be focused on issues of justice and democracy. Sandin (1992) discusses Dewey's theory of virtue in keeping with other modern approaches which see discussions of virtue as discussions about temporary sociological values, not absolutes.

Two major publications came out in 1995: Fine *Habits of Mind* and Neiman *Philosophy of Education*. Fine (1995) argues that we must focus on both continuity with history and solving modern problems. This includes the elements which have been postulated here as historic continuity and contemporary reference. Fine concludes that Dewey and Kohlberg provide the best models for reformulating a set of values for curriculum theory.

Fine's point is also emphasized by Suttle (1995) on the need for intolerance. Suttle shows that educators cannot include all values and all cultures in a decision about curriculum and still do a meaningful task of selection of materials and values to be taught. Absolute inclusion would be no more than a survey of possible choices, which would be endless. Teachers make decisions about what to include and what to leave out of the classroom every day. Therefore there is a need for a rational choice theory which helps teachers make decisions about what to include.

Neiman (1995) edited a massive work on philosophy of education. From the perspective of focus on values, five chapters stand out. Suttle shows the need for "intolerance" and therefore the need for a rational choice theory. He does not develop such a theory, but Kohlberg and Rawls are both mentioned as possible models. Marples (in Neiman, 1995) discusses education and well being, that is, the need for development of the whole person. His discussion illustrates the need for the character virtues (e.g., Noddings, 1996) and national values (e.g., Rokeach). Much of the developmental stages mentioned parallel Maslow and Erickson.

Beck and Kosnik (in Neiman, 1995) argue for a more balanced approach which does not see multi-cultural approaches as competitive so much as complementary and reinforcing. The difference is one of perspective: do we try to include every culture or do we include values which are accessible to all cultures and compatible with all?

Suppes (in Neiman, 1995) revisits the aims of education and concludes that the aims have not changed (character, citizenship, skills) but that modern educational theory is asking different questions about how education is to be conducted and the need for a more humane understanding of personal relationships within the network of social relations. This really asks the character questions in a different way. There has been a growing consensus in Millar (1986), Martin (1987), and Miller (1988).

Goldman (in Neiman, 1995) discusses the need for a social epistemology; a way of knowing based on social relations. The major positions are contrasted as democratic and socialistic, in keeping with the matrix criterion elements in this dissertation of individual freedom and common interests. Development of a social epistemology would clarify the values involved and include a rational choice decision model.

This historical update suggests that the four values of the matrix are well founded, not only in the historic positions discussed but also in the most recent literature. But is the matrix sufficiently inclusive? Specifically, does the matrix provide adequate focus on the current issues of development of character and citizenship (Snauwaert, 1995; Garrison, 1996; Gutmann, 1996; Kaplan, 1996; Rice, 1996)? These issues are included in most theoretical discussion found in recent literature.

Both issues (character and citizenship) relate to the aims of education. In this sense, they are both about outcomes of the educational process. The question can be reformulated as "do the four positions of the matrix allow adequate focus on character and citizenship outcomes?" All four positions include these practical discussion.

The developmental model includes the interests of the individual and the interests of the community (state). There is philosophical space for both character (via Krathwold's taxonomy, 1964) and for citizenship (needs of the state discussed at Kohlberg's level three and four).

The empirical model examines both individual values and the cultural and national grouping of the values. Rokeach does not discuss the formation of these values at either level, but such a study could be done within his system of values.

The intuitive model, represented by Rawls has an interesting blend of personal and social values in the discussion of his original position. He does not focus on the formation of the values held by the individuals. But he does discuss the interplay of values related to citizenship and common interests which each person brings to the community.

The intuitive-democratic model of Burbules is very good on the common interests

(values) which should be taught in schools today. This includes specific information related to character and citizenship. He also discusses the elements of character formation outside the school setting.

Wildavsky's cultural model discusses the common interests of cultural groups, but does little with the formation of values within the group or with the development of individual character of the members of the group.

B. Evaluation

Each of the four positions in the matrix has a certain measure of internal consistency, or they would not have become the major positions of value theorists today. Two tests of consistency are possible: rational and systematic. The rational test focuses on pure reason or logic and tests the credibility of each assertion. The systematic test examines the inner relations of the statements as a set, i.e., it focuses on the consistency of the elements forming a unified theory (much like Turner's development along the levels of abstraction).

From a purely rational perspective, the rational-intuitive position of Rawls perhaps has the greater consistency. He formulates the position from a axiomatic perspective. Each of the other positions begins from empirical research (Rokeach) or experience of teachers, students, and cultures (Burbules, Kohlberg, Wildavsky). Within these three positions the empirical model has the greater consistency since Rokeach used careful analytic procedures and accumulated data from many cultural contexts. The intuitive-democratic model and the cultural model represent positions which focus on the corporate human experience, nationally and in local cultures. With these foci there is less specificity of direct observation and proportionally greater generalization.

This helps the positions of Burbules and Wildavsky to have greater power for generalization, in Turner's terms, but less connection to either logic or empirical validation.

The four models can also be examined for balance: the use of all four of the value elements of the matrix in a cohesive system. The intuitive system of Rawls and the generalized system of Burbules have greater systematic extension and a long history of research. Rokeach has greater breadth across the empirical spectrum. Wildavsky perhaps has greater relevance for cultural approaches to education today. As seen in section four of chapter three, Burbules and Kohlberg are closer to the desired position of analytic models related to middle range propositions.

What can be concluded from this examination of the four positions in terms of systemic consistency and balance of values? Rawls, Rokeach and Burbules have greater internal consistency and Rawls and Burbules have greater systematic extension. Kohlberg and Burbules have the systematic foundation most in keeping with Turner's systematic model. The intuitive- democratic model seems to be the most advantageous overall, but has no central spokesperson at the present.

Chapter V. Conclusion

Chapter four has shown that the matrix presents the four value positions in a way which is useful and relevant to discussions of curriculum values today. Each of the positions "fits" the grid of systematic terms in the adapted method of analysis, and has potential for rational and empirical testing.

Further, the matrix includes value elements identified by Brandhorst (1990) and Fine (1995) in recent discussions. Brandhorst's rejection of economic and control

models lays a foundation for moving to a new theoretical base which does not primarily serve business or government concerns. In this sense it is a constructive response to the deconstructionist and post-modernist concerns. Brandhorst favors a model which includes social issues (common interests) and personal justice issues (personal freedom, with limits in behalf of justice). Fine looks at the other elements of historic continuity and contemporary reference. She looks to earlier sources in Dewey and Kohlberg concerning values for future theoretical development.

The developmental model and the cultural model need greater development in order to give more systematic depth to the positions. The intuitive-democratic model needs to be spelled out in a more cohesive and thorough way, but has a good foundation for such development. The Rawls and Rokeach systems both need to be extended; Rawls toward greater middle range propositions and Rokeach toward an analytic model. Perhaps they can be synthesized into a more dynamic model, since they reinforce similar values. The cultural model needs to be expanded in many directions. It needs to clarify the basis for assignment of values. It needs to extend the theoretical values (essentially multi-culturalism) into practical propositions for classroom and teacher relevance. It needs to relate the axiomatic formal scheme to the middle range propositions of the rich cultural diversity of life in the United States today.

In terms of the actual content of philosophical values, it is possible to see how a more comprehensive set of values could become the basis for research in developing a new curriculum theory. The two founding documents of the United States can be used as a historic base around which all Americans can join (Burbules, 1990, 1995; and Fineberg, 1993). These documents were written, not to set forth a partisan political

position, but to articulate values which may be held as a permanent heritage by all people, on the basis of a certain view of people and interpersonal activities (Alexander, 1992). With these values as the base, a full set of values could be developed to be taught to children as the common American heritage (cf. Bennett, 1993).

It is important that the values in a general or national curriculum be grounded in a position which is defensible as common to all people in the United States (McEwan, 1996; Keat, 1992). The argument has been made that Dewey's emphasis on democratic values as habits of character (1932B; 1938) provides the fundamental direction for Western civilization and encapsulates the primary values of American democracy (Wynne & Walberg, 1984; Caspary, 1990; Harrison, 1994; Burbules, 1996; Rice, 1996).

The Declaration of Independence says that Americans hold certain truths (values) to be self-evident:

1. all persons are created equal;

2. they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; and

3. among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

It states that the purpose of government is to secure these rights.

The Constitution broadens the purposes of government to include:

1. to form a more perfect union;

2. to establish justice;

3. to insure domestic tranquillity;

4. to provide for the common defense;

5. to promote the general welfare; and

6. to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.

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Clauses from these two documents specify ten values: equality, right to life, right to liberty (freedom), right to pursue happiness (autonomy of personal choice), social union, justice, domestic tranquillity, common defense, general welfare, and families.

These ten values can be related to all four of the positions examined in this paper, including Rokeach's terminal values. Such a relationship would link the historic continuity with the contemporary reference. With these ten values as the base and the terminal values as supplements, a full set of values to be taught to children as the common American heritage could be developed (Brandhorst, 1990). This would also include the four elements of the matrix: historic continuity, contemporary reference, individual freedom and common interests.

In chapter one, curriculum decision making was summarized under three metaphors: a conversation, a marketplace, a means of agency. It is now clear that all three of these metaphors are relevant and necessary for constructive and inclusive change to enable educational theorists to present a series of curriculum value options to the teachers and the public of the United States (Vare, 1986; Egan, 1988; Joseph, 1990). Only through conversation and attempts at change will the ideological foundations of life be clarified and educational theory be able to move forward. The new Values Matrix and the revised assessment model will help this to take place.

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